
Qass. 
Book. 







NAVAL RESEARCHES; 

OR 

A CANDID INQUIRY 

INTO THE CONDUCT OF 
ADMIRALS 

BYRON, GRAVES, HOOD, AND RODNEY, 

IN THE ACTIONS OFF 

GRENADA, CHESAPEAK, St. CHRISTOPHER'S, 

AND OF THE 

NINTH AND TWELFTH OF APRIL, 

1782, 

BEING A REFUTATION OF THE PLANS AND STATEMENTS OF MR. CLERK, 
REAR ADMIRAL EKINS, AND OTHERS ; 

FOUNDED ON AUTHENTIC DOCUMENT*, OR ACTUAL OBSERVATION. 

BV 

THOMAS WHITE (a), Esq. 

CAPTAIN, R. N. 

ILLUSTRATED WITH PLANS OF THE BATTLES. 

Palmam qui meruit fcrat. 



WHITTAKER, TREACHER, AND ARNOTT3 

AND W. BYERS, BOOKSELLER TO HIS MAJESTY, DEVONPORT. 
1830. 




TO THE RIGHT HONORABLE 

VICE-ADMIRAL SIR GEORGE COCKBURN, 

G.C. B. M. P. &c. &c. 



Sir, 

The interest with which all subjects connected with 
his profession are necessarily regarded by every one who 
excels in it, encourages me to hope that you will look with 
a favourable eye on the Observations which 1 have ventured 
to lay before you. 

The early opportunities I enjoyed of appreciating the 
zeal and ability which you devoted to Naval Affairs, the 
complete fulfilment of my anticipations, in the value of your 
subsequent services, and our common acquaintance with one 
of the Admirals (Lord Hood) whose memory I have en- 
deavoured to rescue from unmerited obloquy, still further 
embolden me to solicit your permission to introduce these 
"Researches" to the notice of our brother Officers and 
the Fublic, under the sanction of your distinguished name* 

At the same time, it will give me much pleasure to 
acknowledge the many kindnesses 1 have received at your 
hands from the commencement of the long-continued friend- 
ship with which you have honoured 

Your most obedient 

and most devoted Servant, 

THOMAS WHITE (a). 



Buckfast Abbey, Devon, 
November, 1830. 



CONTENTS. 



PAGE 

Dedication .... .... 5 

Preface 9 

Byron's Action off Grenada 15 

List of the Fleet 30 

Explanation of the Plate 30 

Graves's Action off the Chesapeak 33 

Appendix to ditto 65 

List of the Fleets 71 

Explanation of the Plate 72 

Hood's Actions at St. Christopher's 75 

List of the British Fleet 92* 

-French Fleet 93* 

Rodney's Actions of the 9th and 12th of April, 1782 95 

Line of Battle 128 

Supplement to Rodney's Actions 131 

List of the French fleet under Comte de Grasse. ... .... 134 

Ditto under Mons. Bougainville 135 

Explanation of the four Plates .... 336 



PREFACE, 



It cannot but be desirable that every work which 
professes to afford instruction on a subject so impor- 
tant to a maritime nation as that of Naval Evolutions, 
should be as little liable, as the nature of such a work 
will admit, to leave its readers under false impres- 
sions with regard to the movements which it under- 
takes to describe, and which form the basis of its 
deductions. Looking with this view at the Publica- 
tion of the late Mr. Clerk, of Etdin, I cannot in the 
first place, withhold a cordial coincidence with the 
deservedly general estimation in which it is held, 
(particularly with respect to the Tactical part of 
that work) and, from this feeling, I have long been 
anxious that a work of such high authority should 
be free from the few errors into which the Author 
was led most probably from a want of practical ex- 
perience in the subject on which he treats; but I 
have of late felt this anxiety increased in conse- 
quence of the additional importance attached to 
those errors, by the wider circulation and the higher 

B 



10 PREFACF. 

sanction they derive from being incorporated into 
the more recent work on Naval Battles published 
by Rear Admiral Ekins. 

Having devoted a considerable portion of the 
leisure which it has been the lot of many a Sailor on 
shore to enjoy, to keeping alive in my own mind an 
interest in the pursuits of the Profession to which I 
find the attachment which bound me to it in child- 
hood, still unabated, I am desirous that others also 
should cherish at least an equal interest in studies of 
such vital importance to their country ; and, with 
this view, I have endeavoured to divest the generally 
received opinions on certain Naval Movements, of 
the intricacies and contradictions which have hitherto 
enveloped them, and which, if suffered to remain, 
would tend to disgust the young Naval Student by 
their perplexing obscurity, and to damp the ardour 
he might otherwise feel in preparing himself for the 
momentous duties of his profession. 

In the pursuit of this object it has been an addi- 
tional source of gratification, to discover, as I pro- 
ceeded, stronger grounds for assuming that the 
names of several of our Naval Commanders had 
been treated with much greater severity than they 
deserved, and that many of the operations of our 
Navy, which the violence of party spirit, or the 
obliquity of opposing interests, had represented in 
an unfavorable light, required only the persevering 
industry of calm and impartial research, to place 



PREFACE. 11 

them in a point of view in which they may still be 
regarded with pride and gratitude. 

I trust that the pretensions thus advanced will not 
be considered presumptuous when I add, that the 
documents on which they are grounded are of a 
nature widely different from those of which either 
of the above named writers availed himself. While 
the plans given by Mr. Clerk are derived merely 
from his own conception of the Movements as 
described by the Admirals engaged, and while Rear 
Admiral Ekins has adopted the plans thus origina- 
ting with Mr. Clerk, the data on which I have prin- 
cipally founded my Remarks on these movements 
are partly the result of my own personal observa- 
tions, matured by reflection and experience, and 
partly the Plans and Statements drawn by Captain 
Matthews on the spot, and immediately recorded 
after the Engagements. 

Trusting that these sources of information will 
give to the following observations a claim to a 
degree of authenticity to which the before mentioned 
works cannot aspire, I have only to request that the 
indulgence of my readers may be extended to the 
style in which those observations are conveyed. 
Having entered the Navy before I had completed mv 
eleventh year, I may perhaps be excused if I should 
appear to have devoted more attention to the facts 
I relate than to the manner in which they are related : 
I will at least endeavour to be as perspicuous as the 
nature of my undertaking will allow, and nothing 



12 PREFACE, 

shall induce me intentionally to distort or misrepre- 
sent any transaction which may be narrated in the 
following pages. Having no wish but to arrange 
the facts I may be enabled to collect, and to make 
what I trust will form useful deductions from them, 
I need scarcely disclaim the slightest feeling of dis- 
respect whenever I find myself under the necessity 
of differing from the writers who have already 
steered the course which I am about to pursue. 



ADMIRAL BYRON'S ACTION. 



OFF GRENADA, 



ADMIRAL BYRON'S ACTION, 

OFF GRENADA. 



Before I enter upon the details of this engagement, I 
would state a few circumstances connected with the early 
proceedings of the squadron, which may have biassed the 
public mind in forming an opinion upon the merits of its 
Admiral, who, though undeserving of censure, was so 
unhappy as to have the effects of the visitations of Provi- 
dence attributed to his want or skill in his profession, or 
to a want of energy in his character. 

Previous to any declaration of war, or even any avowed 
intention of hostility on the part of France towards this 
country, a squadron of twelve sail of the line, and some 
frigates, had been equipped for service at the port of 
Toulon, with that degree of secrecy which usually charac- 
terized the operations of the then French government ; 
and notwithstanding his Majesty's ministers had received 
intelligence that such an armament was in course of pre- 
paration, and although they must have been aware of the 
object of its equipment, yet they were so infatuated, that 
no measures were pursued to counteract, or anticipate, 
those insidious attempts of France in aid of the cause of 
rebellion in that quarter of the globe, except to send a 
frigate to cruize at the entrance of the Strait of Gibraltar, 
to ascertain when the hostile squadron might pass through, 
and to endeavour to discover its probable destination. 



16 byron's action 

Captain Sutton of the Proserpine, who was entrusted 
with this important mission, descried the French squadron 
on the 16th of May, and, as soon as he could form a con- 
jecture of its course, he returned to England with the intel- 
ligence, and arrived in Plymouth Sound on the 5th of 
June. 

It was afterwards ascertained that this squadron had 
left Toulon on the 12th of April, 1778,* under the command 
of that distinquished officer the the Comte d' Estaing. 

Admiral Byron left Plymouth Sound on the 9th of June, 
with twelve ships of the line, a frigate, and a sloop of war, 
with orders to proceed to North America, the supposed 
destination of Mons. d' Estaing. 

Admiral Byron unfortunately attempted to prosecute 
his passage on a western, instead of pursuing a more 
southern course, which experience has since shown to be 
the safest and the most expeditious. In consequence of 
this, four and twenty days were expended in making a 
hundred and twenty leagues, at the expiration of which 
time, he encountered a tremendous gale of wind, which 
dispersed his squadron. The Admiral was left to prose- 
cute the voyage alone in the Princess Royal, while some 
of his ships were obliged to return to England, and the 
remainder reached such ports in North America as their 
shattered condition would allow them to make. 

If Admiral Byron had been ordered to proceed to 
Gibraltar early in the month of May, instead of waiting 
in Plymouth Sound for the return of the Proserpine, much 
benefit might have resulted from it; and possibly many of 
the disasters which this squadron experienced might have 
been avoided. At all events Lord Howe's gallant little 
squadron, had it been reinforced in time, as it might, had 
the above arrangement been adopted, would have been 



* It is somewhat singular that on that day four years the French Navy 
sustained a defeat from which they never recovered during the war. 



OFF GRENADA. 17 

able to have acted on the offensive, and to have rendered 
ineffectual the co-operation of the French squadron with 
their new allies the Americans — if it had not led to its de- 
feat, or capture. But it was not to be, and zVdmiral Byron 
never collected more than ten out of the thirteen ships of 
the line which sailed with him from England : nor did he 
effect his junction with them until the 26th of September. 

After his arrival in the West Indies from North America, 
he often tried to bring the French squadron to action, but 
without success, owing to their superiority in sailing. 
Admiral Byron had therefore no fair opportunity of re- 
moving the general prejudice entertained against him. 

While he was escorting the homeward bound trade to a 
certain latitude, the French took the opportunity to cap= 
ture the Island of St. Vincent. This they effected with 
only four small vessels and four hundred troops ; owing 
to the culpable negligence of the Governor, and the mili- 
tary commanding officers, who had taken no step what- 
ever to put the island in a state of defence. 

When Admiral Byron returned to St. Lucia from the 
northward he found that the above occurrence had taken 
place during his absence. He accordingly concerted mea- 
sures with General Grant to attempt the re-capture of the 
island. 

During his absence Mons. de la Motte Piquet with seven 
sail of the line had, on the 27th of June, arrived at Mar- 
tinique. Owing to some extraordinary oversight, the 
arrival of this squadron was not communicated to the Ad- 
miral on his return.* Previous to sailing on his intended 
expedition, he sent a small vessel to reconnoitre Fort 
Royal harbour, Martinique. The officer on his return 
reported, that he saw there thirteen large ships, which he 
supposed to be ships of war; that he was confirmed in 
this opinion, by observing, that one of the ships carried a 
flag at the foretop-mast-head ; and that he was prevented 
from reconnoitring them so close as he intended, by a fri- 



18 byron's action 

gate and some small craft being sent in chase of him. 
This intelligence deceived Admiral Byron very much, by 
leading him to conjecture, that M. d' Estaing had not been 
joined by his expected re-inforcements from Europe. In 
the afternoon of the 4th of July, the Admiral received in- 
formation from St. Vincent, that on the 1st instant, a 
French fleet of more than thirty ships of war* had passed 
by that island; and that it was reported, that M. de la 
Motte Piquet had joined M. d' Estaing about a week be- 
fore that time. In consequence of this intelligence, the 
fleet bore up for the Island of Grenada. On the 5th he 
was joined by two schooners from Grenada. By the ac- 
counts which they gave, the invasion of the island was put 
beyond a doubt; but as to the strength of the enemy's 
fleet, their reports were very contradictory.* 

Stedman in his history of the American war, when 
speaking of these vessels having met Admiral Byron, says, 
"Two vessels which had made their escape, after the ar- 
rival of the Count d' Estaing at Grenada, met the British 
fleet ; and from the intelligence brought by them, the Ad- 
miral was led to believe that the naval force at Grenada, 
under the Count d' Estaing, was inferior to his own.f 

The above circumstances are important, as they enable 
the reader to form a more correct judgment of the pro- 
ceedings of Admiral Byron in the action about to be nar- 
rated. 

It will now perhaps be a proper opportunity to lay be- 
fore the reader what Mr. Clerk's opinion was with respect 
to Admiral Byron's mode of conducting his fleet on that 

* The French force amounted to thirty-five ships of war on the day of the 
engagement. 

* Beatson's Memoirs, vol. 4, p. 464, 465. 

t Stedman's History of the War, vol.2, p. 96. All these circumstances 
are not only kept out of sight by the author of ''Naval Battles Critically 
Reviewed and Illustrated/' but in addition thereto, those parts of Admiral 
Byron's Letter which make any reference to them are carefully expunged from 
his extract of it. 



OFF GRENADA. 19 

occasion. "The similarity," says Mr. Clerk, "of this bat- 
tle with that of Mr. Byng, already described, is so great 
that, whether the mode in which the British made the attack, 
or the mode in which the French avoided it, shall be con- 
sidered, we have no doubt of showing, that the circumstances 
in either case are equally effected by the principles laid 
down (section iv.) ; &c. &c." Nor may it be improper, at 
the same time to present the reader with Rear Admiral 
Ekins's opinion of it, couched in the form of an " Observa- 
tion," viz. : "With an inferiority of force (21 to 26 or 27 
ships of the line) it was certainly indiscreet in the British 
Admiral, to attempt to bring on a general action by en- 
deavouring to stop the van of the enemy." 

We will now endeavour to discover how far these reflec- 
tions on the conduct of Admiral Byron can with justice be 
maintained. 



Early on the morning of the 6th, Vice Admiral Byron 
with a fleet of twenty-one ships of the line,* and a convoy 
of transports, arrived off the N.W. part of the Island of 
Grenada, in order to attempt its relief. At 4 a.m. the 
Enemy's look-out frigates announced the approach of the 
British fleet. 

At day-light Admiral Byron perceiving that the Enemy's 
ships were getting under way, made the signal for a General 
Chase in the S.W. quarter, as their outer ships bore at 
that time about S. by W. from the Princess Royal. Soon 
after, the signal was made for the fleet to form into line 
a-head, for their mutual support, according to their respec- 
tive rate of sailing. In consequence of the French fleet 
being in a cluster, while attempting to get out of the bay, 



* One of them, the Medway, carrying 60 guns, was only 1204 tons, and 
was twenty-four years old. 



20 byron's action 

Admiral Byron conceived that their force did not exceed 
fourteen or fifteen ships of the line. The signal was then 
made for the Suffolk and Vigilant to quit the convoy, 
leaving it in charge of the Monmouth. Rear Admiral 
Rowley, with the above ships, had been ordered to stay 
by the transports for the purpose of superintending the 
landing of the troops, unless otherwise directed by signal. 

At six o'clock the signal was made for the ships to en- 
gage as they could get up, without attending to the estab- 
lished order of battle. The British were then running 
down in column, steering about S. by W., with the wind 
at E.N.E., or on the Larboard Quarter. Upon the breeze 
reaching the French fleet their ships endeavoured to draw 
out into line as fast as possible ; the van ships laying up 
north, or along the land 4 with the starboard tacks on 
board. 

When the breeze had enabled the enemy's fleet to draw 
out into line, Admiral Byron was convinced that he had 
been misinformed with respect to their number and force, 
by the masters of the two vessels he had spoken on the 
previous day : for he then discovered that they had twenty- 
six or twenty-seven sail of two-decked ships. "How- 
ever," says the Admiral, in his public letter, " I determined 
to make the attack." And in this resolution he was pro- 
bably strengthened, by having observed, as he ran along 
the land, that the French flag was flying at every signal 
station upon the Island ; he therefore had no alternative 
but to risk the chances of a battle. 

Before he made the above discovery, Admiral Byron 
appears to have had a double object in view; if he saw 
the British flag still flying at St. George's, he was pursuing 
t the course that would have led him to that place ; should 
it be in the possession of the enemy, the course he steered 
would lead him down upon the rear of their fleet ; so that 
he was prepared to adopt either measure, according to 
circumstances. 



OFF GRENADA. 21 

As the two fleets were thus obliquely approaching each 
other, from opposite directions, the weathermost of the 
enemy's advanced ships fired at the British van ; no. doubt 
with the hope of drawing them off from their evidently 
intended attack upon their rear, which was yet unformed. 
But the gallant Barrington was not to be allured or inti- 
midated from steadily pursuing his purpose, and continued 
to steer towards their sternmost ships : nor did he deign 
to return their fire, until he had got sufficiently near to 
them, which he accomplished at half past seven, A. m. 
when he opened his fire on their centre and rear in 
crossing. 

At eight o'clock, the Sultan, the leading ship, had passed 
the sternmost ship of the enemy, and wore round under 
her stern; this compelled the French ship to bear up also 
to avoid being raked. In consequence of this, the Sultan 
was carried so far to leeward that she lost the proud sta- 
tion of leading the fleet, an honor which now devolved on 
the Prince of Wales, Vice Admiral Barrington, who wore 
round, and gradually hauled to the wind on the starboard 
tack, to follow up the enemy. Admiral Byron then made 
the signal for the fleet to ware in succession and to chase 
N.W. ;* then for eight of the headmost ships to form into 
line for their mutual support, without attending to the 
prescribed order of battle, and to engage close. 

While the van was thus waring and forming astern of 
Vice Admiral Barrington, the sternmost ships that were 
coming up, under Bear Admiral Hyde Parker, were en- 
gaged with the enemy while crossing each other from op- 



* The only compass signals of that day were limited to four, viz. the N E , 
N W,, S.E., and S.W. quarters ; therefore, although the signal was made to 
cha?e in the N.W. quarter, it was not meant thereby that the fleet was to 
steer N.W. Mr. Clerk from not having understood the full import of this 
signal, very naturally fell into the error he did respecting it — this miscon- 
ception led to the erroneous theory which he attempted to establish respect- 
ing this engagement : this ought to have been known to all Naval Officers of 
an}' standing in the service. 



22 byron's action 

posite directions. Among these ships the Cornwall and 
Lion, from being nearer to the enemy than those about 
them, (for the rear division had not then formed into line) 
drew upon themselves almost the whole of the enemy's 
fire. In this attack, says Captain Matthews, the above 
ships were much disabled, as was the Grafton, which was 
a-head of them but equally near to the enemy in crossing. 

In order to confirm what I have before advanced — that 
Admiral Byron began the action by an attack upon the 
enemy's rear, — and not their van, as was supposed by Mr. 
Clerk, which supposition has been adopted by Rear Ad- 
miral Ekins, I shall present the reader with the following 
extract from Matthews's account of the engagement taken 
at lhe time. " By eight, the British van had passed the 
rear of the enemy, and immediately veered after them, 
raking them with such effect, that two of the enemy's line 
of battle ships bore away before the wind.* The rear 
continued closely engaged with the enemy till about half 
past eight, the whole having then passed, the signal was 
made to veer and chase to the N.W and for seven of the 
headmost ships to draw into line. In this attack the 
Cornwall, Grafton, and Lion were much disabled, parti- 
cularly the latter.f At nine the signal was made to engage 
as close as possible. 

Rear Admiral Rowley from having been attached to the 
convoy of transports, until called in by signal, was among 
the sternmost ships, endeavouring to get into his station; 
but on perceiving his gallant friend Vice Admiral Barring- 
ton advancing towards him at the head of the British line, 

* These ships I apprehend were driven from their position hy the Sultan, 
and Albion, which were the two leading ships, as they formed astern or the 
Prince of Wale?, when that ship hauled to the wind on the starboard tack. 

t Captain Matthews did not specify the position of the above three ships, 
in his account of the engagement, because his second plate points out their 
exact situation, as well as that of every individual ship ; except those of the 
Suffolk, Vigilant, and Monmouth, which had not then joined, which plate 
will be given herewith. 



OFF GRENADA. 23 

and closely engaged with the enemy, he waited his nearer 
approach, when he wore round without signal, and placed 
himself a-head of the Prince of Wales, then, as well as the 
ships a-stern of her, under a crowd of sail to get up with 
the van of the enemy. 

In this situation the Suffolk continued until she got 
a-breast of the fourth ship in the enemy's line (from the 
van) when they by making sail, prevented her getting up 
with their leading ship. This gave their unoccupied ships 
an opportunity of firing occasionally at her. 

The British van thus advancing, afforded some relief to 
the Cornwall and Lion, by passing between them and their 
opponents, and took up a station a-stern of Admiral Byron 
the moment that they found an opening to enable them to, 
do so. The precise place in the line which those ships 
then took, I have not been able to discover, but it must 
have been a-stern of the Commander in Chief, and not a-head 
of him, as represented in Mr. Clerk's plates of this action. 

The whole of the rear division wore in succession 
and took a station as they could get up, in the wake of 
the Commander in Chief; forming a north and south line, 
and not a N.W. and S.E. as it is represented to have 
done in the plates published by Mr. Clerk and Rear 
Admiral Ekins. 

About ten o'clock the Fame, Cornwall, Grafton, and 
Lion, were so completely cut to pieces, that they were 
obliged to quit the line and drop a-stern in order to repair 
their damages; yet Admiral Byron persevered in his 
attack, although he then had only seventeen to twenty- 
six or twenty-seven ships of the enemy. 

This having been observed by Captain Fanshawe, and 
that the British Van was closely engaged with and op- 
posed to superior numbers, he, in the most gallant manner, 
bore down to the support of the former without signal, 
and placed the Monmouth, the ship he commanded, 
a-head of the Suffolk, Rear-Admiral Rowley, and a-breast 



24 byron's action 

of the third ship of the enemy's line. This gallant pro- 
ceeding Admiral Byron in his official letter, unfortunately 
describes as having been done for the purpose of stopping 
the van of the enemy, (a favorite expression of the day) 
which never couid have been Captain Fanshawe's intention, 
as he placed the Monmouth, as before remarked, a-breast 
of the third ship in the French line,* and not in the French 
leading ship's line of course, — the only mode of stopping 
a ship. 

The action was continued until one p. m., notwith- 
standing the disparity of force, when the French van bore 
up and crowded sail away.f An anonymous commen- 
tator, who frequently appears behind the scenes in the 
work entitled " Naval Battles," very sarcastically says on 
this, that "with British intrepidity it might have ended 
gloriously ;"$ but unfortunately the gallant, and no doubt 
experienced commentator, forgot to subjoin the plan he 
would have adopted, in a similar situation, to have 
achieved so brilliant and so hazardous an exploit. To be 
sure he lays down some common place axioms for the 
conduct of a fleet, but they do not happen to apply to the 
case now under consideration. 

Notwithstanding the injury the enemy's ships sustained 
was not so apparent as that experienced by the British, 
yet their great loss of men could not have occurred with- 
out some of their ships having received material damage : 
for according to the lowest estimate that could be obtained 
of their killed and wounded, the former were said to 

* This part of Admiral Byron's letter appears to have entirely misled Mr. 
Clerk in his view of this battle. 

t Matthews, page 6. 

% In the account given by Rear Admiral Ekins of the gallant defence made 
by Admiral Barrington at St. Lucia, against almost double his force, the 
same commentator, at least I should, by his style, presume him to be the same 
individual, says, " While the British deseive every credit for their skill and 
gallantly, I cannot but think the failure of the attack was owing more to the 
lack of both on the part of the enemy." This appears a strange way of paying 
a compliment to British valour, and to British nautical skill. 



OFF GRENADA. 25 

amount to one thousand two hundred, and the latter to one 
thousand jive hundred',* while in our fleet, only one hun- 
dred and eighty-three were killed, and three hundred and 
forty-six wounded. In one of the French ships, the 
captain, and five lieutenants, were killed.f 

Having thus I trust shown that Admiral Byron con- 
ducted his fleet into action in a manner wholly different 
from that which is generally reported, and having thus jus- 
tified the manoeuvres he was under the necessity of adopt- 
ing, 1 would en passant, advert to the method by which 
the misrepresentations relative to this engagement have 
been attempted to be supported. Had the whole of the 
Admiral's letter been allowed to appear in the work of 
Rear Admiral Ekins, the battle would have worn a very 
different appearance; but then it would have overturned 
the System of Tactics of which the gallant author and his 
Magnus Apollo, Mr. Clerk, appear to be so fond. It is 
right however that Admiral Byron should be permitted to 
speak fully for himself, not only to vindicate his conduct 
in the engagement under consideration, but also with a 
view of pointing out the injury likely to be inflicted by 
such curtailments on the Service in general. 

In order to place the subject fairly before the reader, I 
will subjoin those parts of Admiral Byron's public letter 
which have been so unceremoniously abridged, distin- 
guishing those passages which Rear Admiral Ekins has 
omitted, by printing them between brackets thus [ ]. 

EXTRACTS, WITH OBSERVATIONS THEREON. 

" The signal was made for a General Chace [in that 
quarter, % — as well as for Rear Admiral Rowley to leave the 
convoy ;] and [as not more than fourteen or fifteen of the 
enemy s ships appeared to be of the Line, from the position 

* Beatsoif s Memoirs, vol. iv. p. 469. t Ibid. 

X The S.W. quarter doubtless. 
C 



26 by ron's action 

they were in, the signal was made] to form and engage as 
they could get up."* 

The enemy appearing not to exceed, at that time, four- 
teen or fifteen ships of the line, I cannot but think that the 
signals to chase, to form as convenient, and to engage as the 
ships could get up with the enemy, were decidedly the most 
judicious that could liave been made, under the above cir- 
cumstances ; even if it had been the Commander-in-chiefs 
intention to attack the enemy's van — which it was not; — 
but which both Mr. Clerk and Rear Admiral Ekins seem 
determined to maintain as an incontrovertible fact,f or 
else, why was the above passage rejected by the latter 
writer ? 

EXTRACT. 

" But the enemy getting the breeze [of wind about that 
time,%\ drew out their line [from the cluster they were in,] 
by bearing away and forming to leeward on the starboard 
tack, [which shelved their strength to be very different from 
our Grenada intelligence ;§ for] it was plainly discovered 
they had thirty-four ships of war, [twenty-six or twenty- 
seven of which were of the Line, and many of these appeared 
of great force. However] the general chase was con- 
tinued, and the signal was made for close engagement ; 
[but our utmost efforts could not effect that ;] the enemy in- 



* Clerk's Tactics. 

t See the first " Observation" in page 78 of " Naval fatties." 

J The time alluded to was when the weather ships of the enemy's fleet be- 
gan to fire at the Sultan, Prince of Wales, and Boyne ; the Three Ships that 
led into action. 

§ This intelligence, as before described, was communicated by the two 
schooners that escaped from Grenada on the approach of the French fleet; 
which intelligence at the time they left the island might have been correct, 
as the vessel sent to reconnoitre Fort Royal Bay, Martinique, on the \*t or 
2nd of July, reported to Admiral Byron that thirteen large ships were seen 
there, with a flag at the fore on board one of them; no doubt to deceive. 
These ships might have been De la Motte Piquet's squadron, who had only 
arrived there three days before D'Estaing sailed for Grenada, and might have 
remained for a day or two after. 



OFF GRENADA. 27 

dustriously avoided it, hj always bearing up when our 
ships got near them ; [and I was sorry to observe, that their 
superiority over us in sailing, gave them the option of dis- 
tance, which they availed themselves of, so as to prevent our 
rear from ever getting into action."*] 

As the importance or non-importance of the omitted 
passages given above speak for themselves, they stand in 
need of no observation to strengthen their claim to the 
reader's attention, except to notice the gallant, though 
proscribed " however." 

EXTRACT. 

"The ships that suffered most were the ships the action 
began with,f [and] the Grafton, Capt. Collingwood, 
Cornwall, Capt. Edwards, and Lion, Capt Cornwallis. 
The spirited example of Vice Admiral Barrington [with 
the former Three] exposed them to a severe fire in making 
the attack; [and the latter three happening to be to 
leeward, sustained the fire of the enemy's whole line, as it 
passed on the starboard tmk"% ] 

As some of my readers may not have it in their power 
to refer to the work entitled " Naval Battles," &c. I shall 
take the liberty of transcribing the above extract as it is 
given by Rear Admiral Ekins, to enable them to form a 
comparison. 

"The ships that suffered most were those the action be- 
gan with ; the ships of Captains Collingwood, Edwards, 
and Cornwallis: the spirited example of Admiral Bar- 
rington exposed them to a severe fire in making the 
attack. "§ 

How could that be the case when Captain Colling- 

* Clerk's Tactics. 

t Viz. the Saltan, Prince of Wales, and Boyne. By the omission of the 
conjunction— and,— the laurels these ships acquired are transferred to the 
Grafton, Cornwall, and Lion. 

J Clerk's Tactics. 

§ " Naval Battles," &c. &c. &c. 



28 byron's action 

wood's ship was next to the Princess Royal in the centre, 
and Captains Edwards and Cornwallis were in the rear 
with Rear Admiral Parker? That these ships sustained 
injury in making the morning attack is very certain, but 
from very different causes than those assigned by the above 
extract; unless it were possible for them to be in the van, 
centre, and rear at the same moment of time. 

Mr. Clerk speaking of this action says, " the ships in 
the van were exposed, for a long time, to a heavy fire, they 
could not return." 

Admiral Barrington could have immediately returned the 
fire of the enemy, but as it would have been throwing away 
powder and ball, he very wisely delayed doing so for ten 
or twelve minutes, when having got closer, he opened a 
destructive fire on the French centre,* and a still more de- 
structive one on their rear, his line of march taking him 
very close to them. How long Mr. Clerk's " long time" 
lasted, he has not condescended ro inform his reader. Had 
the attack been in the manner he supposed it to have been, 
doubtless a "long time" would have elapsed ere Admiral 
Barrington could have returned the enemy's fire. 

Had Admiral Byron, as Mr. Clerk represents him to 
have done, chased N.W. in order to bring on the engage- 
ment, when the French fleet were first seen, he would have 
been running away from, instead of advancing towards the 
enemy. 

As Mr. Clerk's remaining observations on this action, 
are founded on the erroneous idea that Admiral. Byron 
brought on the engagement by making an attack on the 
enemy's van, when he in fact began it by assailing the 
enemy's rear, it would be a waste of time to attempt to 
refute arguments grounded on such false data. 1 cannot 



* Forty minutes only elapsed between the time of the French beginning to 
fire, at the greatest possible distance a shot would go, and the Sultan passing- 
close a-stern of the last ship in their line, — dining thirty of which the British 
van were closely engaged while crossing. 



OFF GRENADA. 29 

however but remark, that he has shown so much ingenuity 
in the erection of a superstructure on so sandy a founda- 
tion, that none but those who have the opportunity to 
obtain better information than fell to his lot to be furnished 
with, could doubt of its authenticity, or question its cor- 
rectness. 

With respect to the mode of attack proposed by the 
author of Naval Battles, and so eulogized by an anony- 
mous commentator, it is only necessary to observe that, 
as the two fleets were never situated, relatively to each 
other, as by them supposed, — no refutation is necessary, 
nor need any comment be offered on it except to say, that 
had Admiral Byron attempted such a manoeuvre, D'Estaing 
was, no doubt, too well versed in tactics not to have known 
how to take advantage of such a movement.*" Indeed, had 
the gallant author and his friend been aware of the actual 
situation of the two fleets, they, doubtless, would never have 
hazarded such a proposition, as the one in question, as 
the attack would have been made on the enemy's fleet 
formed en enchelon, or, like a crescent, bending to leeward 
from the centre to the rear, instead of being in a straight 
line as by them supposed, and as exhibited in the plate 
given in that work. 

Whenever any mode of attack is suggested, a plan of 
ulterior proceedings should accompany it, in order that the 
pupil may know how to recover his ground in time, should 
the supposed enemy attempt to counteract the intended 
movement. Any general may be able to lead an army on 
to battle, but a good one is required to know how to ex- 
tricate it out of a difficulty, or to secure its retreat if 
necessary. 



* The mode of attack proposed was, to a&sail with the 12 feterumost ships 
17 or 18 of the enemy. 



30 



LIST OF THE FLEET. 



That the public may be acquainted with the names of 
those officers whose actions merit the gratitude of their 
country, I shall, though it be not very usual in the present 
day, beg leave to subjoin the following list of the fleet en- 



gaged. 










Ships. Guns. 


Captains. 


Admirals. 


i 


Suffolk, 


74, 


H. E. Christian, 


Rear Admiral Rowley. 


2 


Boyne, 


70, 


Herbert Sawyer, 




3 


Royal Oak, 


74, 


Thomas Fitzherbert, 




4 


Prince of Wales, 


, 74, 


B. Hill, 


Hon. S. Barrington, Vice- 


5 


Magnificent, 


74, 


J. Elphinstone, 


Admiral. 


6 


Trident, 


64, 


A. J. T. Molloy, 




7 


Medway, 


60, 


Wm. Affleek, 




8 


Fame 


74, 


J. Butchart, 




9 


Nonsuch, 


64, 


W. Griffith, 




10 


Sultan, 


74, 


A. Gardner, 




11 


Princess Royal, 


90, 


W. Blair, 


Hon. J. Byron, Com- 


12 


Albion, 


74, 


J. Bowyer, 


m ander-in-Chi ef . 


13 


Sterling Castle, 


64, 


R. Carkett, 




14 


Elizabeth, 


74, 


Wm. Truscott, 




15 


Yarmouth, 


64, 


N. Bateman, 




16 


Lion, 


64, 


Hon. Wm. Cornwall is, 




17 


Vigilant, 


64, 


Sir Digby Dent, 




18 


Conqueror, 


74, 


H. Harmood, 


Rear Ad ml. Hyde Parkei 


19 


Cornwall, 


74, 


Tim Edwards, 




20 


Monmouth, 


64, 


R. Fanshawe 




21 


Grafton, 


74, 


Thomas Collingwood 





EXPLANATION OF THE PLATE GIVEN HEREWITH. 

The number against each ship in the Plate will give her name by referring 
to the above List. 
B The British fleet 
F The French ditto, 
g French store-ship left at anchor. 
The Fleets were situated, as shewn in the Plate, at 15 minutes past 7 A. m. 




~&JR&JVu±1>jL 



tiLg. 



G-.Coopet[_ 



Stoaehouse 



--iszz 



grjuwaijA 







\ 



^A 



hi 






ADMIRAL GRAVES'S ACTION, 



OFF THE CHESAPEAK 



AN ACCOUNT 

OF THE 

ACTION OFF THE CHESAPEAK, 

BETWEEN 

REAR ADMIRAL GRAVES AND THE COMTE DE GRASSE, 

TOGETHER WITH ALL THE CIRCUMSTANCES CONNECTED 
WITH THIS AFFAIR. 



Having observed that the Engagement between Ad- 
miral Graves and the Comte de Grasse, off the Chesapeak, 
has been represented differently by different writers, I have 
been induced to devote some attention to the subject, and 
being in possession of information now known but to a few 
individuals, I trust I shall be enabled to bring before the 
public a detailed statement of facts, as they really oc- 
curred, calculated at one and the same time to set the af- 
fair in its proper light, to rescue the distinguished naval 
characters who were present from unmerited obloquy, and 
to furnish a supply of facts for the information of those 
whose pursuits are directed to the study of Naval Tactics. 
I have found myself more especially called upon of late to 
undertake an investigation into the particulars of this en- 
gagement, from the circumstance of its having been ad- 
verted to by a recent professional writer, who has under- 
taken to enlighten the nautical world with an illustration 
of this, among other naval actions fought during our late 
wars, in which the most serious charges are brought against 



34 GRAVES'S ACTION 

the conduct of one, if not both of the English Admirals 
engaged. No man who feels interested in the character 
deservedly acquired by the Navy of this country can 
remain passive while he sees it suffering under the inflic- 
tion of a series of unfounded allegations, tending at once 
to cloud the fair lustre of its former fame, and to obstruct 
the path which may lead to its future glory. 

The two charges which I am anxious to investigate are, 
the one of dilatoriness in obeying the signals of his com- 
manding officer, and of not bearing down to engage the 
enemy, brought against Sir Samuel Hood, and the other of 
Admiral Graves having omitted to exert himself as much 
as he might have done in aid of Lord Cornwallis's army. 
But in the course of this investigation it will be my object 
not only to disprove the allegations under which the me- 
mory of those commanders is suffering, but to give such a 
minute and detailed account of the movements of the hos- 
tile fleets on the station in question, as will elucidate 
several confused and contradictory statements in the work 
of Rear Admiral Ekins, and will furnish the young naval 
student with the means of acquiring correct and distinct 
views of operations which the above work has involved in 
considerable obscurity. 

It is necessary to premise that the whole naval force in 
North America under Admiral (afterwards Lord) Graves, 
even when reinforced by the squadron under Sir Samuel 
Hood, consisting of 14 sail, did not exceed twenty-one 
ships of the line ; of which number, the Robust was unfit 
for service, and the Prudent incapacitated for a time, in 
consequence of the injury they had sustained in a previous 
engagement, while acting with Admiral Arbuthnot, the late 
Commander-in-chief on the station. 

On the 31 st of August, Admiral Graves with five sail of 
the line and a 50 gun ship, stood out from Sandy- Hook, 
and joined the squadron under Sir Samuel Hood, then 
getting under way without the Bar. Admiral Graves being 



OFF THE CHESAPEAK. 35 

the senior officer, assumed the command of the united 
squadrons, consisting of nineteen sail of the line, and a 50 
gun ship, besides several frigates. With these Admiral 
Graves directed his course for the Chesapeak, whither he 
had been taught to expect that the Comte de Grasse would 
bend his course, with such ships as he could bring with 
him from the West Indies ; but which it was supposed, if 
not inferior, would certainly not be superior to the fleet 
now under his command ; consequently, if he could attack 
Monsieur de Grasse before he could form a junction with 
the Rhode Island squadron, under Monsieur de Barras, 
consisting of eight ships of the line, besides several frigates, 
there was every probability of his being able to accom- 
plish something, which might frustrate the plan of opera- 
tions contemplated by the Franco-American sea and land 
forces, for the expulsion of the British troops from the 
southern states of that nascent Republic. 

Previous to quitting Sandy-Hook, Admiral Graves had 
obtained intelligence (as will be shown hereafter) of the 
French squadron having left Rhode Island under Mons. 
de Barras, for the presumed purpose of joining de Grasse 
in the Chesapeak. This of course increased the British 
Admiral's anxiety to engage one or other of the enemy's 
squadrons before they could form a junction — facts, which 
many Historians almost pass over unnoticed. These cir- 
cumstances of course precluded the British Admiral from 
digesting any decided plan of operations until he could as- 
certain whether De Grasse was yet arrived in the Chesa- 
peak, and if lie were, what force he had brought with him, 
and how he had disposed of it. Until he could obtain in- 
formation on these important points, the line of proceeding 
must naturally be contingent and uncertain. Yet writers 
frequently imagine that plans involving consequences of 
the highest importance to a state, can be considered, 
matured, and executed, by officers in command, in, per- 
haps, less time than they themselves might require to decide 



36 graves's act son 

upon the -performance of the most trivial occurrences of 
life. 

I shall now take the liberty of laying before the reader 
a copy of all the important parts of Admiral Graves's 
letter as given by that candid and judicious, although, oc- 
casionally, misinformed writer, Clerk of Eldin, as it con- 
tains many passages necessary, it appears to me, to give 
a clearer view of this affair, than the mutilated letter given 
by Rear Admiral Ekins. To the intelligent reader the 
probable causes which induced the exclusion of these pas- 
sages will be obvious, when he compares them with the 
reasonings hereafter to be submitted for his consideration. 
The omitted passages will be comprised within brackets 
thus [ ]. 

" Extract of a Letter from Rear Admiral Graves to Philip 
Stevens, Esq. dated off Sandy-Hook, 3Lst August, 

1781.* 

" I beg you will be pleased to acquaint my Lords Com- 
missioners of the Admiralty, that the moment the wind 
served to carry the ships over the bar, which was buoyed 
for the purpose, the squadron came out ; and Sir Samuel 
Hood getting under sail at the same time, the fleet pro- 
ceeded together, on the 31st of August, to the south- 
ward. 

[" TJie cruisers which I had placed before the Delaware 
could give no certain information, and the cruisers off the 
Chesapeak had not joined.] 

" The wind being rather favourable, we approached the 
Chesapeak the morning of the 5th of September, when the 
advanced ship" (the Solebay) " made the signal for a fleet. 
We- soon discovered a number of great ships at anchor 
[which seemed to bef] extended across the entrance of the 

* There must be an error in the date of this letter, as it describes events 
that occurred subsequent thereto. 

f By omitting this passage, Admiral Graves's public letter is made to 



OFF THE CHESAPEAK. 37 

Chesapeak,* from Cape Henry to the middle ground, 
[They had a frigate cruizing off the Cape, which stood in 
and joined them; and,] as we approached, the whole fleet 
got under sail, and stretched out to sea, with the wind at 
N.N.E.f As we drew nearer, I formed the line first 
a-head, and then in such a manner as to bring his 
Majesty's fleet nearly parallel to the line of approach of 
the enemy ; and when I found that our van was advanced 
as far as the shoal of the middle ground would admit of, 
I wore the fleet, and brought them upon the same tack 
with the enemy [and nearly parallel to them, though we 
were by no means extended with their rear. J:] So soon as 
I judged that our van would be able to operate, I made 
the signal to bear away§ and approach, and soon after to 
engage the enemy close. Somewhat after four, the action 
began among the headmost ships, || pretty close, and soon 

correspond with the erroneous position of the French fleet, as it is represented 
in a plate given by Rear Admiral Ekins, copied from Clerk's ivork on Naval 
Tactics. 

* Instead of the French fleet occupying the space between Cape Henry and 
the middle ground, as erroneously imagined by superficial writers on this 
subject, who have never taken the trouble to look further than this unex- 
planatory, unchronological letter for the ground work of their several 
hypotheses on this affair, De Grasse had actually anchored as close as he 
could, with safety, to the watering place in Lynn-haven Bay ; but, on ap- 
proaching to that place in the oblique direction we did, the French fleet might 
seem to be so situated ; and it was so qualified in Admiral Graves's original 
letter. 

i The Solebay discovered the French fleet at half past 9 ; Admiral Graves 
saw them from the London's, whether mast-head or deck is not specified, at 
anchor at 11 ; and the French fleet did not get under way until noon. See 
the French account. 

t Why was this passage omitted in the work alluded to? 

§ It is to be regretted that the public letter should not have more particu- 
larly specified whether this signal was addressed to the whole fleet, or to the 
van ship only, for the benefit of writers on naval masters, who may not be 
able to obtain any other information, than that which the public Letter affords 
them : the fact is that the signal was addressed to the Van exclusively ; which 
the passage implies, though not expressed with accuracy. 

|| This is the first instance of the Official Letter specifying the date of any 
occurrence, although six hours and a half had elapsed since the signal was 
made by the look-out ship for discovering the enemy's fleet. Consequently 



38 GRAVES'S ACTION 

became general, as far as the second ship from the centre, 
towards the rear. The van of the enemy bore away, to 
enable the centre to support them,* or they would have 
been cut up 

" The action did not entirely cease till a little after sun- 
set [though at a considerable distance ; for,] the centre, of 
the enemy continued to bear up as it advanced ; and at 
that moment seemed to have little more in view than to 
shelter their own van as it went away before the wind.f 

"His Majesty's fleet consisted of nineteen sail of the 
line ; that of the French formed twenty-four sail in their 
line. [After night, I sent the frigates to the van and rear, 
to push forward the line,% and keep it extended with the 
enemy, with a full intention to renew the engagement in 
the morning; but when the frigate Fortunee returned from 
the van, 1 was informed that several of the ships had suf- 
fered so much, that they were in no condition to renew the 
action until they had secured their masts : we, however, 
kept well extended with the enemy all night.] 

["We continued all day, the 6th, in sight of each other, 
repairing our damages. Rear Admiral Drake shifted his 
flag into the Alcide, until the Princessa had got up another 
main-top mast. The Shrewsbury, whose captain lost a 
leg, and had the first lieutenant killed, was obliged to reef 



the reader can form but a very imperfect idea of the various operations per- 
formed ; while the historian is frequently led into error ; and the critic into 
a labyrinth ; where he alike bewilders himself' and his readers from the want 
of attention to time. 

* The French account, which, I believe, was tolerably correct, states — that 
the French van bore away, by signal, from De Grasse, it being too far to wind- 
ward to form a good line with the centre and rear. 

t Had this paragraph been transposed by Admiral Graves, it would have 
made it more intelligible. 

% This portion of Admiral Graves's Letter, appears to have been thrown 
overboard by the gallant hibtoriau, lest it might seem to contradict the 
Pamphlet on which his account of this battle is founded. To il push forward 
the line" conveys a very different meaning from the supposed order " to fight 
closer," as asserted in that pamphlet. 



OFF THE CHKSAPEAK. 39 

both top-masts, shifted her top-sail yards, and had sus- 
tained very great damage. I ordered Captain Colpoys of 
the Orpheus to take command of her, and put her into a 
state for action.] 

["The Intrepid had both top-sail yards shot down, her 
top-masts in great danger of falling, and her lower masts 
and yards very much damaged, her captain (Molloy) having 
behaved with the greatest gallanti'y to cover the Shrewsbury. 
The Montague was in great danger of losing her masts ; 
the Terrible so leaky as to keep all her pumps going; and 
the Ajax also very leaky.*] 

["In the present state of the fleet, and being five sail of 
the line less in number than the enemy, and they having 
advanced very much in the wind upon us during the day, 
I determined to tack after eight, to prevent being drawn 
too far from the Chesapeak, and to stand to the north- 
ward."] 

I shall now take a hasty view of the operations, and 
force of the fleet under the command of Monsieur de Grasse. 

On the 30th of August, the French Admiral in Lynn- 
haven Bay, — not with fourteen sail of the line, as had been 
anticipated by his Majesty's government at home, and by 
Sir George B. Rodney, the late Commander-in-chief on the 
Leeward Island station ; — but with twenty-eight, f and 
several frigates. On the day of his arrival, he captured 
the Loyalist sloop,! and compelled the Guadaloupe to 

* These suppressed passages will contiibuie to substantiate what will be 
advanced hereafter with respect to the policy of Monsieur de Grasse keeping 
his fleet at long shot distance, for the reasons that will be then given. Those 
persons who have only read Rear Admiral Ekins's Historical Illustrations of 
this battle, would naturally conclude it to have been little more than a sham 
fight, (which in the rear it certainly was) as no account is given of its results. 

f So stated by Stedman in his History of the American War: but I believe 
with only twenty-seven, and a fifty gun ship. 

J If the Loyalist sloop and Guadaloupe frigate had been ciuizingas they 
■were ordered, instead of being at anchor, Sir Samuel Hood might have fallen 
in with them, as it was expected he would ; Admiral Graves would have been 
informed of the strength of De Grasse's fleet; and they might have escaped 
capture. , 



40 GRAVES'S ACTION 

seek refuge up the York River, with Lord Cornwallis's 
army, then only eight days established at York Town, 
which he had to fortify in the best manner he could, and 
ivhere he was ordered to remain until reinforced from Sir 
Henry's Clintons army at New York ; which will be ad- 
verted to in its proper place. The Comte brought with 
him three thousand troops under Brigadier General St. 
Simon, to reinforce La Fayette's corps, and ultimately to 
join in the intended operations contemplated by General 
Washington against the Earl of Cornwallis's little army, 
pent up in a place so situated, that it could only be suc- 
coured by a preponderating naval and military force.* 

De Grasse, immediately, sent three ships of the line up 
the Chesapeak for the purpose of blocking up the York 
River, where, a small British naval force was acting with 
Lord Cornwallis ; and a fifty gun ship, and some frigates, 
up the James River to cut off his Lordship's retreat, should 
he attempt to escape into North Carolina. 

The Compte also sent the boats of his fleet on shore at 
Lynn-haven to procure and complete the water his ships 
stood in need of, preparatory to his proceeding through the 
Channel formed by the shoals of the middle-ground and 
the Horse-shoe, at the upper entrance oi which he intended 
to moor his fleet, so as to preclude the British from mo- 
lesting the operations of the combined armies, the moment 
Monsieur de Barras should arrive with his squadron, con- 
sisting of eight ships of the line, and four frigates from 
Rhode Island, then hourly expected. These judicious 
plans were, however, for a time, delayed, by the appear- 
ance, on the 5th of September, of xldmiral Graves with 
nineteen sail of the line, whose fleet was seen by Monsieur 

* When St. Simond's corps joined that of La Fayette's, the two together 
must have equalled Lord Cornwallis's army; whose operations were of ne- 
cessity confined to the erection of temporary works round York Town ; which 
it required every arm to effect before Washington came up with his main 
body, then on its way to Philadelphia. 



OFF THE CHESAPEAK. 41 

de Grasse's look out frigates cruizing in the offing, at about 
half past 9 a.m., directing its course for the shoal of the 
Middle-ground. 

At first it was supposed by de Grasse, that the squad- 
ron indicated by the look out frigates, was that of Mon- 
sieur de Barras ; but a very short time convinced him of 
his mistake, and that it was the British fleet. The boats 
were immediately recalled, and preparations made to weigh, 
as soon as the ebb-tide* would enable them to work out of 
the Bay ; without which tliey would not have effected it. 

In the mean time, the fleet, under Admiral Graves, was 
approaching under fore-sails, top-sails, and top-gallant 
sails, with a fresh breeze at N.N.E., and steering about a 
S.W. course. At 10 o'clock a.m., Admiral Graves made 
the signal to prepare for action ; and at 11 o'clock, for the 
line of battle a-head, and for Sir Samuel Hood's division 
to lead. At 1 p.m. the signal was made to form on an 
East and If est line; soon after, for Rear Admiral Drake's 
division to make more sail; and at 2, for the fleet to wear 
together,f and to bring to on the larboard tack. 

At noon, the tide making out, the French fleet began to 
weigh, the outermost ships first.J Some of the headmost 
ships were not obliged to make more than one board, while 
the innermost ships were compelled to make several tacks ? 
ere they could weather Cape Henry ;§ the whole forming 
into line, as fast as they could, after they attained to, and 
stretched out from, the southern part of the Middle-ground ; 
from which they could weather the above-named cape. 
Before two o'clock, the rear had got clear of the Horse- 

* This circumstance is never alluded to, either by Rear Admiral Ekins in 
his historical account of this affair, or by the writer in the Political Magazine, 
quoted by him. 

t Beason's Memoirs, 

$ See French account of this action, published at Cape Francois. 

§ Had the French fleet been at anchor, as represented in the plates of this 
action given by Rear Admiral Ekins, they would have had no difficulty in 
getting out. 

D 



42 GRAVES'S ACTION 

shoe sand, and were tolerably well formed on the south 
side of the Middle-ground, and, as well as the van, and 
centre, was standing out of the Bay. 

At half-past 2 p. m. Admiral Graves made the signal for 
the fleet to fill, the French van having then got nearly 
abreast of the British. The two fleets were, at that time, 
almost parallel to each other, and nearly on an east and 
west line — but at least three miles asunder. The Admiral 
then made the signal for the van to fill and bear away two 
points ; and shortly after, for the rear to fill. The signal 
to keep more away was afterwards repeated once or 
twice ;* but at each time it was addressed to the van ship, 
and the rest were of course to follow in her train. At half- 
past three the signal was made for the ships to close to 
one cable's length asunder ; and for the rear division (then 
Sir Samuel Hood's) to make more sail; and soon after for 
the leading ship to keep more to starboard. 

Every officer who has served much in the line of battle 
during war, must be aware, when the signal for closing the 
line is made, that, the signal for the stern-most ships to 
make more sail may be addressed to the rear division or 
its commander, by the commander-in-chief, without his 
intending to convey the slightest censure, either to the ad- 
miral, or the captains serving in that division. 

Had the signal in question been often repeated — a fact 
not exactly stated — but strongly implied in Rear Admiral 
Ekins's account of this affair — then that division, and its 
Commander, would have merited the implied censure. 

At 4 o'clock, the headmost ships in Rear Admiral 
Drake's division began to engage the van of the enemy, 
under Monsieur de Bougainville, whose division, at first, 
was a little separated from the French centre and rear. 

* In that day it was necessary to repeat that signal for every additional 
point, that the ship it was addressed to was to haul to starboard or to port. 
It is of importance that this be kept in mind ; our improved signals not making 
it now necessary to do so from having compass-signals. 



OFF THE CHKSAPEAK. 43 

De Grasse, aware that the projected operations in North 
America depended mainly on the efficiency of the fleet 
under his command, and not from any unworthy, or dis- 
honourable motive, made the signal for his van to bear 
away and take up a fresh position more to leeward, where 
they placed themselves at long shot distance ; upon which 
Admiral Graves repeated the signal for the British van 
" to haul more to starboard," i. e. bear away. This gave 
their adversary the opportunity of directing their fire 
coolly and deliberately at them, as they were again in the 
act of running down to renew the combat. 

Soon after this, some ships immediately a-head of Ad- 
miral Graves, thinking themselves to be near enough to 
the enemy, hauled up, from the lasking course the fleet 
was sailing on, in order to engage.* 

This of course caused some delay and confusion among 
the ships a-head of the London, but I can take upon my- 
self to assert, that no such confusion was experienced among 
the rear division, as is asserted by the author of " Naval 
Battles." 

From the circumstance of the van having kept away at 
different periods, from two to four points, the British fleet 
became ranged in a south east and north west line, instead 
of an east and west one, as it was at two o'clock. This 
will account for the circumstance of only twelve of the 
headmost ships having had an opportunity to fire upon the 
enemy, as well as for the exclusion of the remaining seven, 
which consequently were too distant from the French rear 
to fire with effect. 

Although the signal for close action was flying at the 
same time with that for the line on board the London, yet, 
Sir Samuel Hood conceived it to be his duty, not to com- 
ply with the former, since he could not do so without vio- 

* A similar circumstance occurred to the unfortunate Admiral Byng, and 
was one of the principal causes of the catastrophe which ensued to the fleetj 
and to himself. 



44 graves's action 

lating the latter. But the moment that the latter signal 
was hauled down, which it was at half-past § p. m. on 
board the London, Sir Samuel Hood made the signal for 
his division to bear up, and steer for the enemy's rear, 
which, as well as ours, had not been engaged. The leading 
ship of this division not complying with the signal, he 
hailed the Monarch, his second a-head, and ordered her 
captain to "lead him down within point-blank shot of the 
enemy ;" which order was most joyfully complied with by 
all on board the two ships, who longed "to be at them ;" 
but their sails were scarcely trimmed, when the signal for 
the line was re-hoisted on hoard the London, to the great 
mortification of every one on board. These ships' signals, 
(the Barfleur and Monarch) were also made to re-take their 
stations in the line. When the Monarch hauled to the wind 
in obedience to these signals from the Commander-in- 
Chief, she was compelled to throw all aback in order to 
avoid the shot fired over her, by her leader, which had not 
quitted the line.* 

From Admiral Graves having caused his fleet to bear 
away in succession, van ship first, instead of ordering the 
whole fleet to bear away together, the two lines from being 
parallel to each other, as was the case at two o'clock, ulti- 
mately formed an angle of at least thirty degrees. Con- 
sequently, when the van ships of the respective fleets were 
within musket shot of each other, the two rear ships were 
not within reach of cannon ball. Therefore, if Admiral 
Graves thought proper to conduct his fleet into action in 
the way he did, there can be no just grounds for throwing 
blame on the Second in Command, as is done in the follow- 
ing passage in Rear Adml. Ekins's work on Naval Battles, 
which states, that — " It was not until half-past 5 o'clock, 
when the rear division (Sir Samuel Hood's) bore down 
into action. At 40 minutes past 3, p. m. the line was 

* The Monarch's log will testify to the above fact. 



OFF THK CUES APEAK. 45 

closed to one cable asunder ; and it appears that much dif- 
ficulty was experienced by Admiral Graves in getting some 
of his ships to keep their stations, and great dilatoriness on 
the part of the rear division in obeying his signals and closing 
with the enemy." 

Now I should be glad to know where Rear Adml. Ekins 
obtained the information on which he has founded this grave 
accusation against Sir Samuel Hood and his gallant divi- 
sion. He surely would not have given publicity to asser- 
tions so injurious to the professional character of one of 
the first officers in our naval service, on the bare authority 
of an ephemeral pamphlet,* which was published after the 
action, in vindication of the conduct of the Commander- 
in-Chief, without substantiating them by evidence derived 
from a purer source, and of less suspicious authority. 

Did that writer ever consult the London's log lodged in 
the Navy Office ? will that log, or the log of any other in- 
dividual ship in the fleet, confirm the statement thus pub- 
lished to the world? If they do, I shall be induced to 
fancy, that what I that day saw and heard, was a mere 
chimera of the brain, and, that what I believed to be the 
signal for the line, was not a union jack,f but an ignis 
fatuus conjured up to mock me. 

I shall now proceed to investigate the latter part of the 
before-quoted paragraph from Rear Admiral Ekins's work ; 
which, had the order of time been observed in its construc- 
tion, would have commenced instead of concluding the 
passage alluded to. " It appears that much difficulty was 
experienced by the Admiral in getting some of his ships to 

* It would have been a happy circumstance if this ill-judged pamphlet had 
never seen the light, as it has greatly contributed to mislead naval writers, 
cast a shade over the fame of one Admiral, without exculpating or removing 
the blame which evil report had affixed to the other. 

t That flag at the mizen peak was the signal for the line, at that time; it 
was uniformly kept flying while the line was tot>e preserved: nor was it 
hauled down from 2 p. m., until the action was over, except for about the 
space often minutes; at half-past 5 P M., the period alluded to. 



46 GRAVES'S ACTION 

keep their stations, and great dilatoriness on the part of the 
rear division in obeying his signals and closing with the 
enemy." 

Now as this tirade commences with, and is closed by, 
animadversions on the rear division, the reader cannot but 
conclude, that the whole of the passage is intended to be ap- 
plied to that division, without a single proof being adduced 
on which to ground the offensive charge. Had Rear Ad- 
miral Ekins remembered what happened in Byng's action, 
and had he been better informed of the occurrences which 
took place in this, he would have known that " the diffi- 
culty experienced by the Admiral in getting some of his 
ships to keep their stations," was precisely the same in 
both ; and that instead of its occurring among the rear 
division, it arose from two or three of the ships a-head of 
the Admiral hauling up to fire at the enemy, before they 
were near enough,* instead of steering upon the lasking 
or diagonal course prescribed by him, as that by which 
the enemy were to be approached. Why, then, should the 
unfortunate rear division, by implication even, be involved 
in the errors of that part of the fleet, over which Sir Samuel 
Hood had no control? 

As for the charge of " dilatoriness," I shall merely ob- 
serve, that the rear division was close to, and in perfect line 
with, the centre division, and all the ships from the Com- 
mander-in-chief to the sternmost ship of the rear division^ 
were so near to each other (after the signal was made to 
close to one cable's length) that the jib-boom of each was 
over the tafrail of her leader ; — and if this manifests dila- 
toriness, then I admit, the rear division deserved the cen- 
sure so inconsiderately heaped upon it. 

1 would now ask, what signal or signals were disobeyed, 
or even delayed in the execution, for a single moment, by 
Sir Samuel Hood or his division on that day ? 

* I could designate the precise ships; but respect for the dead — who no 
tioubt meant well — restrains my pen. 



OFF THE CHESAPEAK. 47 

Was that division to be stigmatized because it could not 
obey two opposite signals at once — that for the line, and 
that for close action, — when the two lines formed an acute 
angle of thirty degrees, instead of being parallel to each 
other? The answer must be very evident to those, who, 
from experience, understand the management of a fleet. 

I shall now proceed to the last part of the charge, with 
respect to the order of time, although in the author's mode 
of arranging the sentence, it stands at the head and front 
of it ; viz : — " It was not until half -past 5 when the rear 
division (Sir Samuel Hood's) bore down into action." 

This mis-statement first appeared, where it might na- 
turally be expected to find place, in an ex-parte pamphlet, 
published with the express purpose of removing popular 
odium from one individual by saddling with it his second 
in command, whose shoulders were probably thought broad 
enough to sustain the weight, but who occupies too eleva- 
ted a station in the Temple of Fame, to be affected by it. 
But it is astonishing that it should have been transcribed, 
after a lapse of 42 years, unsupported as it is by a shadow 
of proof, into a work professedly written to criticise and 
illustrate naval actions, more especially when the author 
could have found unexceptionable authorities for his state- 
ments in the log-books of the fleet, which are deposited 
and preserved in the Navy Office. 

From the above mis-statement, any uninformed person 
would naturally conclude, that Sir Samuel Hood had per- 
versely remained to windward, and would not, however 
ordered by signal to do so, come down to the aid and assist- 
ance of the van and centre divisions partially engaged with 
the enemy. This, however, no one who had served in that 
fleet, would have been hardy enough to assert : and had 
Sir Samuel Hood so conducted himself he would have de- 
served to have been shot. 

Now the simple fact, which gave a colour to the above 
mis-statement, was this. At half-past 5, Admiral Graves 



48 GRAVES'S ACTION 

hauled down the signed for the line as before intimated, and 
kept the signal flying for close action. The road to glory 
then became plain and easy ; nor did Sir Samuel Hood 
lose a moment in availing himself of 4the opportunity thus 
afforded him of doing his duty to his king and country; 
for he instantly made the signal for his division, then in 
close order and right astern of the Admiral, to bear up out 
of the line, and steer right down upon the enemy, then at 
random shot distance. The Monarch, commanded by the 
gallant Reynolds (afterwards Lord Ducie,) and the Bar- 
fleur, Sir Samuel Hood's ship, had scarcely trimmed their 
sails for running before the wind, when the signal for the 
line was re-hoisted on board the London, and, for these ships 
to re- take their stations which they had but just quitted for 
the express purpose of closing with the enemy. 

This might have appeared like confusion in the Rear 
Division, to the Admiral's Secretary or Flag Lieutenant 
on board the London, for to both the honor of furnishing 
these " Minutes" is attributed, on which the afore-men- 
tioned pamphlet was founded. 

From what has been said on this subject, I think the 
reader will be induced to come to the conclusion that Sir 
Samuel Hood acted correctly in continuing, as he did, 
in the Line of Battle prescribed by his Senior Officer, 
notwithstanding the signal for close action was flying with 
that for the line of battle a-head. For, when Sir Samuel 
Hood did bear up to engage the enemy, in conformity with 
^he former signal, when that for the line a-head was hauled 
down on board the London, his signal was immediately 
made to re-take his station in the line: and lest that might 
be misunderstood, the signal for the line of battle a-head, 
was re-hoisted at the same time, although the signal for 
close action was flying. Was Sir Samuel Hood to obey 
the signals thus addressed to him, to return into the line ; 
or was he, in defiance of them, to rush down and engage the 
enemy, when expressly ordered to the contrary by signal 
from his commanding officer ? 



OFF THE CHESAPEAK. 49* 

No experienced officer will hesitate for an instant what 
answer to give, who sets a just estimate on the value and 
importance of strict discipline, and implicit obedience. 
To these, under Divine -Providence, we owe all our naval 
triumphs, and when they are once undermined, we may 
bid adieu to victory. 

Having, I hope, rescued from obloquy the professional 
character of that deservedly celebrated officer Sir Samuel 
Hood, whose cool, intrepid conduct and strong nerve I 
had frequent opportunities of witnessing in the moment of 
danger, I shall now endeavour to show that the censures 
so liberally heaped on Admiral Graves, by the Political 
Magazine quoted by Rear Adml. Ekins, for not succouring, 
as it was termed, Lord Cornwallis's army, were as unjust, 
and as unmerited as those calumnies with which his second 
in command was assailed by the pamphlet before alluded 
to. The want of correct information led the authors of 
both these publications to draw the erroneous conclusions 
which have misled the public respecting this affair. 

That the Commander-in-Chief's mode of conducting his 
fleet into battle was a bad one, none I think will attempt 
to dispute — but it was agreeable to the tactics of the day ; 
and Admiral Graves had a very difficult card to play. 

Admiral Graves had not only a very superior force to 
contend with on the 5th of September, but there were 
eight ships of the line that De Grasse expected to swell, 
his numbers with, coming from Rhode Island ; besides the 
three which he had left to block up the York River, and 
which he could call to his assistance whenever he desired 
it : — all of them powerful and efficient ships, which was 
not the case with the British fleet. 

Besides, on that fleet, inferior as it was, depended the 
fate of America. And he had not only a more powerful, 
but a more wary foe to contend with, who from the superior 
sailing of his ships, had the means of either closing with, 

E 



50 gk ayes' action 

or withdrawing from his adversary, as he judged most ex- 
pedient. 

Instead oi running direct for the Chesapeak, it is much 
to be regretted that Admiral Graves did not attempt to 
intercept the Rhode Island squadron, which he knew had 
left that place, previous to his sailing from Sandy-hook, 
in order to join the Comte de Grasse at the Chesapeak. 
Even had he failed in intercepting it, nothing worse could 
have happened than did occur — that of rendering his fleet 
useless for upwards of five weeks, which valuable time was 
lost in attempting to repair and make it fit for service, 
when too late to be useful. 

But had he succeeded in falling in with it, the advan- 
tages that might have resulted therefrom, would have been 
incalculable ; and four days of perseverance might have 
crowned the effort with success ; as Barras anchored on 
the 9th in Lynn-haven Bay. The only precaution to have 
been taken would have been to have kept De Grasse in 
ignorance of his being on the coast, by sinking every vessel 
he fell in with, and by keeping just out of sight of land. 

A plan of attack on Rhode Island had been proposed 
by Sir Henry Clinton to Admiral Graves and Sir Samuel 
Hood, for the express purpose of obaining possession of 
that squadron ; but which plan was put a stop to, by their 
learning, while deliberating upon it, that Monsieur de 
Barras had left that place on the 25th of August. The 
measure proposed would have been advantageous either 
way. Had Admiral Graves succeeded in capturing that 
squadron, it would have greatly paralyzed the efforts of the 
besieging army, if it would not have prevented its operations 
altogether ; it would have put the two fleets nearly on an 
equality in point of numbers, and would have arrested the 
progress of the French arms for the ensuing year in the 
West Indies ; and might, possibly, have created such a 
spirit of discord between the French and Americans, as 
would have sunk the latter into the lowest depths of de- 



OFF THE CHESAPEAK. 51 

spair ; from which they were only extricated by the arri- 
val of the forces with De Gras.se. 

Besides, had not Providence crowned the endeavour 
with success, and had Monsieur de Barras passed the 
British fleet unobserved, yet this good would have resulted 
from it — that Admiral Graves, after the enemy's fleet had 
been thus augmented to 35 sail of the line (including the 
three at the mouth of the York River), would have deemed 
it expedient to have avoided a battle with such a prepon- 
derating force as sixteen sail superior to his own; by which 
we should have saved the Terrible, (burnt in consequence 
of her being rendered incapable of service in the action), 
and have prevented the injury which the other six disabled 
ships sustained in the action, without any beneficial result, 
which it took more than a month to repair and again render 
fit for service. The Admiral would, also, have been ready 
to have returned to the charge with an encreased force, 
(two more ships having arrived from the West Indies, and 
and three from England) which, with the 7,000 troops, 
(sent too late) might have enabled him, had he not been 
so long detained in refitting his disabled ships, to have 
anchored his fleet in Hampton Roads ; where, with the 
aid of the above troops, provided they could have arrived 
before Washington came up with his whole force, he might 
have been enabled to have extricated Lord Cornwallis's 
army from its injudicious and perilous situation, even in 
the face of such a superior naval force if it were anchored 
above the Horse-shoe and Middle-ground : a position 
which the French fleet took up, the moment it returned to 
the Chesapeak, after the engagement. 

Had the action been avoided, as I presume it ought to 
have been, there would have been twenty days for carry- 
ing the above operations into effect; in which time they 
could have been accomplished, had not the action occurred, 
and had not Sir Henry Clinton engaged in the extraordi- 
nary expedition against New London. 



52 GRAVES'S ACTION 

Thus we perceive that many adverse circumstances^ 
unfortunately, concurred to prevent the adoption of mea- 
sures, which, perhaps, no skill or foresight on the part of 
Admiral Graves could have surmounted or averted,* and 
over which he had no control ; indeed, a short reference 
to the circumstances of the times will convince us, that he 
could scarcely even consider himself permitted to exercise 
his discretion on the point of fighting or avoiding the 
enemy. An ordinary mind can be little aware of the firm- 
ness which it requires to enable a commanding officer to 
set public opinion at defiance, and, regardless of any other 
object, to keep steadily in view, under critical circum- 
stances, the conscientious discharge of his duty to his king 
and country. However coolly we, at this distance of time, 
may balance in our minds the propriety or impropriety of 
the course of operations in question, it is well known, that 
the coffee-house politicians of the day were clamorous, be- 
cause nineteen indifferent ships did not capture or destroy 
twenty-four of the finest ships (every circumstance con- 
sidered) that ever left a French port. 

Suppose Admiral Graves had proceeded after the battle 
with his six disabled ships to the mouth of the York 
River, as suggested by the writer in the " Political Maga- 
zine," quoted with so much confidence by Rear Admiral 
Ekins, could he u there" have procured the means of refit- 
ting them ? I venture to affirm that he could not have ob- 
tained the most trifling supply either of spars, cordage, or 
any other article requisite to refit his fleet, and put it into 
a fit state again to face the enemy: besides, how could his 
expected reinforcements have joined him " there V 

Considering then, with candour, all the circumstances 
of the case, I cannot but conclude, that after the action 
nothing more could have been done than was done by 

* For instance, how could Admiral Graves have prevented the capture of 
the Guadaloupe and Loyalist, which had been ordered by him to cruize oft' 
the Chesapeak to give him information of'De Grasse's arrival and force? 



OFF THE CH-.KSAP.EAK. 53 

Admiral Graves and the fleet under his command. In a 
word, there was a wai)t of judgment and judicious co- 
operation in a quarter, where blame has not attached — in 
order, as it were, that a double portion might be accumu- 
lated on Admiral Graves — or Admiral any-one who served 
in the fleet which for a time was under his orders. 

If the same display of energy had been exhibited in re- 
moving, succouring, or reinforcing Lord Cornwallis's army 
in August, that was used in the preceding March to assist 
the brave Arnold's little force then threatened with destruc- 
tion, the unhappy fate of the former might have been 
averted ; and that unfortunate war might have terminated 
under more favorable auspices. 

Admiral Graves's intention in going to the Chesapeak 
was to ascertain the force and discover the intentions of 
the enemy ; and if possible to attack De Grasse before he 
was reinforced by the Rhode Island squadron ; or to at- 
tack the latter should he fall in with it ; and — not to suc- 
cour or withdraw Lord Cornwallis's army, as erroneously 
imagined by the writer in the " Political Magazine." 

In order to substantiate what I have above hinted at, 
it will be necessary to take a succinct review of the mili- 
tary operations in Virginia from the previous December, 
when that excellent, and enterprising officer, Brigadier 
General Arnold was sent there, with 1050 men, for the 
purpose of creating a diversion in favour of the British 
army in South Carolina ; and for other military purposes^ 
which it is not my intention to enter upon, except as far 
as they may be connected with the subjects on which I am 
about to treat. 

His first object, after his arrival in Virginia, was to 
select a fit spot to fortify and establish as a place of arms; 
and as Portsmouth appeared to possess many advantages,* 



* See its advantageous position in the accompanying map, both as a place 
of defence, as well as for relief from naval co-operation. 



54 GRAVES'S ACTION 

he decided upon fortifying it, for that purpose. The fa- 
cility with which he was subsequently reinforced there, 
when expected to be attacked, proved it to have been the 
place above all others, in that vast expanse of waters, for 
an army to occupy, that might occasionally require the 
aid of a fleet, to support, or withdraw it. 

Its neighbourhood to Lynn-haven Bay gave great fa- 
cilities to any communication with that anchorage; its 
situation on the Elizabeth River ensured a communication 
with any naval force that might occupy Hampton Roads, 
situated at the mouth of the James River, at a distance 
not exceeding five miles ; while the entrance to one or other 
of these Roadsteads might have been accessible to a sus- 
taining naval force, an advantage which York-town did not 
possess ; as the passage through which you must approach 
it, is easily shut up by a superior naval force of the enemy 
against any fleet wishing to proceed to or return from it. 

Washington, being particularly anxious to put a stop 
to the depredations committed by Arnold's active little 
force, an object which, after he had fortified Portsmouth, 
he felt himself at liberty to attempt, earnestly solicited 
Monsieur d' Estouches, the French naval officer, then com- 
manding on that station, to embark some French troops 
on board the squadron under his command, and proceed 
with them to the Chesapeak, for the express purpose of 
annihilating Arnold's army, and destroying the small 
British squadron acting with him. 

These solicitations were at length complied with on the 
part of the French commanding officer, and Monsieur 
d' Estouches, having embarked some troops, left Rhode 
Island on the 8th of March, 1781, with seven sail of the 
line, one 44-gun ship (the Romulus) of two decks, and 
some frigates, and proceeded therewith for the Chesapeak. 

Admiral Arbuthnot having been informed of the sailing 
of the above squadron, by Sir Henry Clinton, and that the 
Chesapeak was in all probability the place of its desti- 



OFF THK CUES APEAK. 55 

nation, immediately proceeded to sea from Gardner's Bay, 
in Long-Island, in order to intercept the enemy's squadron, 
and frustrate their purpose, if possible, of establishing 
themselves in Virginia. 

Although he sailed two days later than the enemy, yet, 
by dint of carrying sail, he arrived off the Cape of Virginia 
before him. His squadron consisted of seven line of battle 
ships (one of which was a three-decker) and a fifty-gun 
ship ; so that the British had then rather the superiority of 
force, if not of numbers ; the reverse of which was the case 
with Admiral Graves. The two fleets were fought in the 
old-fashioned way — that is, the British went down on a 
diagonal line, or in a lasking direction, and the French 
avoided close action ; consequently the usual results were 
produced — their disabling the ships in the British van, 
and these killing the men in that of the French : this action 
afterwards deprived Admiral Graves of the services of the 
Robust and Prudent, from want of means to refit them at 
New York. 

Monsieur d' Estouche, not being apparently very hearty 
in the cause of his good allies, returned to Rhode Island, 
instead of proceeding to his destination; and Admiral Ar- 
buthnot went to Lynn-haven Bay,(it being then a friendly 
port, from its vicinity to Arnold's force) to relit his shat- 
tered ships, and to cover such reinforcements as he ex- 
pected would be sent to General Arn6ld. 

Upon this occasion, Sir Henry Clinton acted with vigour 
and promptitude, by sending two thousand troops, under 
Major General Philips, to reinforce Arnold's army; and 
under such convoy as the senior naval officer at New York 
could furnish lain with. They happily escaped the French 
squadron, and arrived safe, while the British squadron was 
lying in Lynn-haven Bay.* From this place the General 

* This may account for Admiral Graves subsequently wishing to remain 
as long as he could off the Chesapeak, to cover any reinforcements that might 
be sent toLord CoriiWidlis's army. 



56 graves's action 

marched his troops, and joined General Arnold the same 
day, at Portsmouth. This afFair greatly mortified General 
Washington. 

Had the same measures been resorted to before Admiral 
Graves left Sandy Hook, it would have been his fault if 
Cornwallis's army had not been relieved or, at least, 
if something had not been attempted in his favour, by 
Admiral Graves. 

Soon after these occurrences, Lord Cornwallis thought 
proper to quit South Carolina, and march into Virginia, 
where he formed a junction with the above force at Peters- 
burgh, situated on the south side of the James River. 

This step, which was highly approved of by his Majesty's 
ministers, unfortunately gave umbrage to the Commander- 
in-Chief at New York, ivho did not approve of his Lord- 
ship's having done so, or indeed of any of his subsequent 
movements ; and yet would not prescribe for him any posi- 
tive line of proceeding, until he came to the fatal decision 
of cooping up this gallant army within the neck of land* 
where they could not defend themselves, and from whence 
they had no retreat. 

One day, troops were sent to augment this army, the 
next, they were recalled, and when embarked, were again 
countermanded ; so that what between doing and undoing, 
marching and counter-marching, it could begin nothing in 
earnest, either offensively, or defensively, until the 22nd 
day of August, when it became finally established at York 
Town, — a place totally unfortified, where they were to en- 
trench themselves, and act on the defensive, until the Com- 
mander-in-Chief judged the moment to be arrived for car- 
rying on, what he termed, " solid operations." To estab- 
lish the army in this sickly, untenable place, Lord Com- 

* Sir Henry Clinton so designated it; but as it is ten miles wide in every 
part, it derived no additional strength from that circumstance. Had York 
been built on a promontory and united to the main by a narrow neck of laud, 
there might have then been some good ieason for selecting it. 



OFF THE CHESAPEAK, 57 

wallis was ordered to abandon and totally evacuate Ports- 
mouthy which was fortified ; and from whence, had he been 
allowed to use his own discretion, he might have retreated 
into South Carolina the moment he found that no imme- 
diate succour could be reasonably expected in time after 
the encounter between the two fleets, and the junction of 
the two squadrons under the Comte de Grasse. 

By retreating before Washington could bring up his 
whole force, he would have completely frustrated all the 
enemy's plans, and the aid of this vast fleet would have 
been rendered useless, for that season at least: nor did 
the French admiral show himself so hearty in the republi- 
can cause, as to have gone much out of his way to serve 
them. 

That York Town did not afford protection to shipping, 
the event too plainly showed, yet it w T as for this purpose 
that this ineligible place was selected by Sir Henry Clin- 
ton.* Had he possessed more local knowledge, or had he 
trusted more to the judgment of Lord Cornwallis, who had 
the means of personally appreciating its value, one may 
venture to believe, that York Town would not have been 
selected for this army to have acted on the defensive in, 
against an enemy possessing four times its force , and with 
an immense fleet to cover the operations of Washington's 
army. 

Lord Cornwallis had not concentrated his whole force 
at York, consisting of 5000 men, more than eight days, 
when the Comte de Grasse arrived in Lyn-haven Bay 
with twenty-seven sail of the line, one fifty-gun ship, and 
several frigates ; having 3000 troops on board, under the 
command of Mons. de St. Simon, on the 30th of August. 
The Glorieux, Vailliant, and Triton, of the Line, and two 

* The Charon 44, the Guadaloupe frigate, and the Vulcan fire ship, were 
on the 10th clay of the siege burnt by red hot shot from the enemy's batteries, 
and most of the transports were sunk in this " strong position," recommended 
by the " Political Magazine." 

F 



58 graves's action 

frigates, were immediately sent up through the passage 
between the Horse-shoe sand and the Middle-ground, to 
anchor before, and block up the York River ; and the Ex- 
periment of 50 guns, L' Andromache of 32 guns, together 
with several smaller vessels, were also sent up the James 
River, to cover the disembarkation of the French troops 
under Monsieur de St. Simon ; and to effectually cut off 
the retreat of the British army to the southward. Thus we 
perceive, at the very commencement of the enemy's opera- 
tions, the folly of having selected York Town as the place 
whereon our army was to await that succour, which did 
not quit the British head quarters, at New York, until the 
very day it was compelled to surrender. 

Need any more be said to convince even the most scep- 
tical, that Portsmouth was the place which that ill-fated 
army ought (as was intended by his Lordship) to have 
occupied, and not York Town?* Indeed to such an ex- 
treme degree was this army neglected, that on the day of 
its surrender, the military chest was reduced to the paltry 
sum of £1800. — a sum considered to be so contemptible 
by the French Commissioners, appointed to see the capi- 
tulation executed, that they would not condescend to no- 
tice it, until urged to do so by their more sordid allies :f 
consequently Lord Cornwallis did not possess the means 
of obtaining, for want of money, the necessary information, 
either of Washington's approach, or of La Fayette's move- 
ments; — and whatever aid Admiral Graves might have 
been enabled to have afforded his Lordship, I think it may 
be aSvSumed as a fact, that he was not furnished with a 
single dollar to supply the unpardonable deficiency : yet 
in most of the accounts hitherto published of this affair, 
writers have most unblushingly asserted, or obscurely 

* Lord Cornwallis had actually left this "neck of land" and marched to 
Portsmouth, when he was ordered to retrace his steps, and return to York 
Town. 

t See Gordon's history of that war. 



OFF THE CHESAPEAK. 59 

hinted, that the loss of this little gallant army was attri- 
butable to Admiral Graves, or the fleet under his com- 
mand ; without being able to advance a single fact in proof 
of their loose assertions, which are generally founded in 
error, prej udice, or misconception ; and without possessing 
local knowledge, professional skill, or even common in- 
formation, of the subjects on which they presume to 
write.* 

It will now be necessary to take a hasty view of the 
proceedings at New York, the seat of our military authori- 
ties at that period. 

General Washington, or the American Fabius, as he 
was justly denominated, was not quite certain at the 
commencement of the campaign, where the naval and mili- 
tary forces of his most Christian Majesty would be directed 
to carry on their operations ; or, if he were acquainted with 
this secret, he possessed the happy art of retaining it. 
But be that as it may, in order to deceive the British 
General, or to have his troops at hand, should New York 
prove the object of their joint attack, Washington concen- 
trated the allied forces at White Plains, making occasional 
demonstrations of attacking the British out posts ; but 
which proved to have been only feints, to confirm Sir Henry 
Clinton in the fatal delusion that New York was the ob- 
ject of these manoeuvres. This farce was continued to 
be enacted until the middle of August, when the American 
General received dispatches from the Comte de Grasse, 
informing him that it was his intention to be ready to act 
with him in the Chesapeak, whither he was bending his 
course, and where he might be expected about the latter 
end of August. If any doubt respecting the scene of ac- 
tion did exist in Washington's mind, of which I am very- 
sceptical, it was now removed, and he accordingly threw 
off the mask, by decamping from White Plains, and con- 

* Admiral Graves recommended Point Comfort — not York Town, to be 
taken possession of by Lord Cornwallis's army. 



60 grates's action 

ducting his army over the North River, and marching upon 
Philadelphia. Just about this time, the 11th of August, 
2500 troops, besides recruits for the different regiments, 
arrived at New York, from England. 

To any one not acquainted with the complicated science 
of military tactics, the obvious mode of proceeding would 
have been to have immediately detached these and such 
other as could be spared, in order to have sent them with 
Admiral Graves, to reinforce Lord Cornwallis's army, then 
about to entrench itself at York Town in Virginia ; but 
other views dictated a very different mode of proceeding, 
as will be hereafter shewn. 

When Sir Samuel Hood arrived off Sandy-hook, he went 
on board the London, to communicate with Admiral 
Graves on their future operations. These officers were 
met by Sir Henry Clinton, who had come down from New 
York to the Hook, to propose a conjoint expedition 
against Rhode Island, in order to take possession of that 
place, and capture the French squadron lying there. This 
measure would have created a real diversion in favour of 
Lord Cornwallis's army, had it been projected in time, and 
would no doubt have brought back Washington with his 
whole force, and might have disconcerted all his measures 
for that campaign ; but while these officers were delibera- 
ting, news arrived that Barras had left that place on the 
25th, consequently the project fell to the ground. But so 
enthusiastically* attached was this General to diversions, 
that he was still resolved to make one, though on a smaller 
scale, but still in the opposite direction to that in which 
Washington was marching, and on much less important 
objects than the destruction of a French squadron. This 
expedition was directed against New London, and consisted 
of 5000 troops, who sailed thither in transports five days 

* As might be shewn upon another occasion of the same vital importance 
with his affair. 



OFF THE CHF.SAPEAK. 61 

after the British fleet had left Sandy -hook, without a soldier 
on board, either to reinforce or succour the apparently for- 
gotten army at York Town. 

I have already given an account of the action between 
the two fleets and its results, and shall therefore not say 
any more on that subject, except to observe, that if Sir 
Henry Clinton had embarked the above 5000 men on board 
the fleet, previous to its leaving Sandy-hook to proceed off 
the Chesapeak, in order to reinforce Lord CornwalhVs 
army, instead of going in the direction it did, and had Ad- 
miral Graves failed in putting into execution the General's 
requisition to land them, then indeed Admiral Graves 
might have merited the censures so unsparingly heaped 
upon him, by those who appear to have been very ill in- 
formed of the subject in question. 

It appears that it was not until after the sailing of Ad- 
miral Graves's fleet, and about the return of the above- 
named expedition, that a council of war was convened at 
New York by the military Commander-in-Chief, in order 
to deliberate on the measures necessary to be taken for the 
relief of Lord Cornwalliss army. It resolved, "That 
5000 troops should be embarked on board the King's 
ships,* in order to proceed to the assistance of Lord Corn- 
wallis : and on the supposition that the French were masters 
of the Chesapeak, it was judged expedient that this rein- 
forcement should be sent immediately." 

But on receiving the account of the engagement between 
the two fleets, Sir Henry Clinton called a second council 
of war, in which it was resolved, "That it was advisable 
to wait for more favorable accounts from the Admiral, or 

* At this time, that is, when this council of war came to this decision, five 
of the King's ships were so disabled as to be incapable of service for a con- 
siderable time, and one burnt, from having been rendered entirely useless. 
This council of war must have been assembled about sixteen days after Ad- 
miral Graves had sailed. 



62 GRAVES'S ACTION 

for the arrival of Admiral Digby, who was daily expected, 
with three sail of the line ; it being known that Earl Com- 
wallis had provisions to last to the end of October.* 

This shows the danger of delay, in all the concerns of 
life ; but in none more so than in the military and naval 
profession. 

While time was thus flying on silver pinions at New 
York, the hoary sire was crawling on those of lead at York 
Town, where the flattering hope of relief was poured into 
the ear, but never gladdened the heart, or met the ardent 
gaze of its desponding garrison ; whose despair or courage 
was alike unavailing, encircled as it was on one side by 
the largest fleet that ever covered the surface of the Chesa- 
peak, while on the other it was enveloped by the finest 
and most numerous army that Washington had ever had 
under his command. 

Each day brought the enemy's approaches nearer to his 
Lordship's scarcely erected works, as is shown in Lord 
Cormvallis's letter of the 15th October, 1781, addressed to 
Sir Henry Clinton, of which the following is an extract. 

"My situation now becomes very critical. Experience 
has shewn that our fresh earthen works do not resist their 
powerful artillery, so that we shall soon be exposed to an 
assault in ruined ivorks, in a bad position, and with weak- 
ened numbers. 

" The safety of the place is therefore so precarious, that 
I cannot recommend that the fleet and army should run 
great risk in endeavouring to save us."f 

This then was the situation to which this unfortunate 
army was reduced, from the want of promptitude in the 
Commander-in-Chief, combined with his w r ant of confi- 

* Beatson's Memoirs, vol. 5, p. 280. The members appear to have laid a 
great stress upon York being provisioned, while more important things seem 
to have escaped their notice. 

+ Beatson's Appendix. 



OFF THE CHE5APEAK. 63 

dence in Lord Cornwallis, and from having selected such 
a spot as York Town for the British to make a stand on, 
it being unprovided with any fortifications, previous to 
the 22nd of August ; from which time the whole army were 
occupied in constructing temporary works for its protec- 
tion, instead of being able to act offensively against La 
Fayette; or to make the smallest effort to prevent the 
junction between the corps under that officer and the troops 
landed from De Grasse's fleet, in the James River, under 
Monsieur de St. Simon. 

On the 17th of October, Lord Cornwallis, finding it to be 
impossible to defend his dilapidated works any longer, at- 
tempted to transport his remaining efficient force across 
the York River, leaving the sick and wounded behind him ; 
in the desperate hope of making his escape through Mary- 
land and Pensylvania, or of deferring his capture for a 
time. Part of his troops had got over to Gloucester, when 
the very elements seemed to have conspired against him, 
a sudden gale arising, which prevented his boats returning 
until it was too late to proceed in the attempt; the enemy 
having penetrated his Lordship's intention. This reduced 
him to the necessity of adopting the only alternative left 
him, that of surrendering ; in order to prevent the place 
being taken by storm. On the 19th of October, the British 
army amounting only to 4017 men fit for duty, marched 
out with the honors of war, and surrendered to Washing- 
ton, whose force amounted to 21,000 men.* 

With a view to put the reader in possession of Lord 
Cornwallis's opinion of York Town, and at the same time 
to shew him when his Lordship was first taught to expect 
the assistance of the fleet, and when it was concerted be- 
tween the military and naval Commanders-in-Chief to co- 
operate for his relief, I shall beg leave to subjoin a few 

* See Stedman's account of the proceedings of Lord Cornwallis's army, in 
his History of that War. 



64 graves' s action 

extracts from the correspondence which took place on 
this subject between Sir Henry Clinton and Lord Corn- 
wailis. The first is an extract from one written by his 
Lordship in reply to a letter he had received from Sic 
Henry, dated the S Lth of June, 1781, " recommending his 
Lordship to take a defensive station on any healthy spot, 
be it at William sburgh or York Town." « 



EXTRACT. 

" Williamsburgh, June 30th, 1781. 

" He submitted it to Sir Henry's consideration, as there 
was little chance of being able to establish a post for the 
effectual protection of ships of war, whether it was worth 
while to hold a sickly defensive post, which always, would 
be exposed to a sudden French attack, and which experi- 
ence had now shewn made no diversion in favor of the 
southern army.*" 



[The second letter of Lord Cornwallis, dated " York 
Town, Virginia, 15th. October, 1781," has been already 
given in page 62, to which I beg to refer the reader.] 



In two days after his Lordship was obliged to capitulate, 
and on the day following marched out and surrendered 
himself and army to Washington ; and the only remaining 
ship of war which the enemy had not burnt in this "strong 
position," was delivered up to the Gomte de Grasse. 

The third letter from his Lordship was dated "New 
York, 2nd December, 1781," of which the following is an 
extract. 

* See Beatson's Appendix, and Stedman'a History of the War. 



OFF THE CHESAPKAK. 65 

" III regard to the promise of the exertions of the navy 
previous to your letter of the 24th of September, I can only 
repeat what I had the honor of saying to your Excellency, 
in the conversation to which you allude, that — Without any 
particular engagement for the navy before that date,* all 
your letters held out uniformly hopes of relief; and that 
I had no reason from any of them to suppose that you had 
lost sight of the possibility of effecting it."f 

This last extract must, I should think, convince any 
unprejudiced mind, that when Admiral Graves left Sandy- 
hook, on the 31st of August, in order to proceed to the 
Chesapeak, he had neither been solicited, nor was it even 
expected by Sir Henry Clinton that he should attempt, 
under any circumstances, either to relieve, succour, or bring 
away Lord Cornwallis's army. 



APPENDIX. 

Having had to allude to extracts introduced, and 
therefore, to a certain extent, adopted by Rear Admiral 
Ekins in his work, I shall, for the information of those 
who may not have that work to refer to, insert them here, 
that they may themselves be able to judge of their merits, 
or demerits. 

No. 1. In the Political Magazine for 1782, it is said of 
this affair, that "the Souverain, the flag ship of De Grasse, 
was entangled with the shore in four fathoms water in 
getting under way at ten in the morning. 

No. 2. " If Admiral Graves, upon seeing the enemy, 

* See Beatson's Appendix and Stedman's History of the War. 

t It was not until the 24th of September, or nineteen days after the action 
uras fought, and five subsequent to the admiral's return to New York with 
his shattered fleet, that Admiral Graves promised the assistance of the fleet 
to relieve Lord Cornwallis's armv!! .« 



66 GRAVES'S ACTION 

had pushed into the bay, as the wind was perfectly fair for 
him, he would have found the French fleet in the utmost con- 
fusion, &c." 

No. 3. " He also might have taken up the anchorage 
there at the mouth of the York River in a strong position. 
He would also have found some ships of war of the enemy 
there, and been at hand to support Lord Cornwallis. 

No. 4. " Even after the action he might have attempted 
to gain the Chesapeak : but this, after five days, De Grasse 
prevented, by going back there himself. 

No. 5. De Grasse, with his fleet, had to turn out of the 
bay, and were in great irregularity, struggling with the 
shore and shoals of Lyn-haven Bay." 

OBSERVATIONS. 

The first short article contains only three mis-statements. 
The Souverain 74 was not the flag-ship of de Grasse, 
but the Ville de Paris 110 ; the flag-ship was not entangled 
with the shore in five fathoms water" for if she had, she 
must have remained, as she drew two feet more, and it 
was a falling tide when she weighed anchor ; nor did she 
get " under way at ten in the morning" but at noon.* 

In reply to the second article, I shall only observe that 
Admiral Graves's public letter stated — At 2 p. m. " 1 wore 
the fleet to bring them on the same tack with the enemy, 
and nearly parallel to them."f Now if the enemy's fleet 
was in confusion when the British van reached the outer 
edge of the Middle-ground, how could Admiral Graves have 
formed his fleet in a line parallel to that of the enemy? 

In answer to the third article, it is only necessary to 
observe, that — Admiral Graves could not have anchored 
his fleet, as stated in that article, because the wind was 

* In the preceding page, Rear Admiral Ekins states that — At eleven, the 
enemy's large ships hove in sight at anchor; consequently the above circum- 
stances could not have taken place at ten. 

t The last part of the above extract from Admiral Graves's letter, has been 
most unaccountably excluded from Rear Admiral Ekins's version of it. 



OFF THE CHESAPEAK. 67 

not so perfectly fair for Mm, as to have enabled him to 
have done so with an adverse and falling tide:* unless it 
can be shown that a man-of-war can lay within five points 
of the wind ; and the position suggested by the writer for 
the fleet to have anchored in, would have been seventeen 
miles from Lord Cornwallis's army. 

With respect to the fourth article, it is to be regretted 
that the writer of it had not been more explicit, in pointing 
out what benefit was likely to result from Admiral Graves 
" gaining the Chesapeak" after the action, supposing such 
to have been his purpose. Could Admiral Graves have 
refitted his disabled fleet there? And what was to have 
been the object of such an attempt? 

The fifth, and last article, betrays such a total ignorance 
of the Chesapeak generally, and of Lyn-haven Bay in 
particular, as well as of the time and circumstances under 
which the Comte de Grasse left it, as to require no answer 
whatever, or any attempt at its refutation. 

That such loose, incoherent, and undigested remarks and 
comments should have been published at the time to mis- 
lead the public mind, to answer a political purpose, or to 
shift the odium from one individual to another, no one 
can be astonished at ; but that they should have found 
their way into a work professedly written to convey in- 
formation to young sea officers, and to instruct them in tac- 
tics, is rather an unusual mode of inspiring them with ve- 
neration for those whose conduct they ought to be taught 
to esteem, ta venerate, and to imitate. 

Is it not dreadful then to think that our Admirals who 
are sacrificing all the sweets of domestic comfort, all the 
endearing ties of social intercourse, and risking health, 
and perhaps, life itself in the service of their country, 
should, in the execution of this patriotic duty, be subject 

* These considerations appear to have been too minute, and too trifling, 
for the writer of the above article. The ebb ran on that day until between 
six and seven in the evening ; or until after it was dark. 



68 GRAVES'S ACTION 

to such unfounded insinuations against their professional 
character, as the incoherent passages which were published 
in the said " Political Magazine'' must inflict upon any 
feeling and honourable mind. 

I shall now give the reader a slight sketch of Ports- 
mouth in Virginia, which I cannot but think, was the 
place, of all others in that neighbourhood, for the British 
army to have made a stand at, with a view to resist the 
storm, which was well known to be impending over it 
in that province, months ere it burst upon, and over- 
whelmed it. 

Portsmouth, in Virgina, is situated on a small tongue 
of land, projecting into the estuary of the Elizabeth river, 
washed on the eastern side by that river ; and on the 
west by another, sufficiently large to afford protection 
from an attack by land. These circumstances, and its 
vicinity to Hampton Roads, and Lyn-haven Bay, no 
doubt influenced Generals Leslie and Arnold, in 1780, and 
in 1781, to select it as the most appropriate spot for a 
place of arms. The former officer commenced, and the 
latter finished the fortifications required for that purpose : 
nor was its value diminished on the occasion in question, 
in the estimation of Lord Cornwallis, whose military ex- 
perience and local knowledge was of little avail, when 
set in competition with the positive mandate of his com- 
manding officer, to evacuate it, and to take possession of 
York Town, unfortified, and seventeen miles distant from 
any anchorage for line of battle ships ; and from whence 
he could not retreat. 

That valuable work, the <e Annual Register for 1781," 
in speaking of this place says, "Portsmouth had been 
strongly recommended, and unwillingly quitted by the 
Commanders then on that service, as a post calculated for 
maintaining by land a kind of warfare, at once defensive 
on their part, and extremely distresssing to the province, 
and at the same time, for affording such a station to the 



OFF THE C11ESAPEAK. 69 

British fleets and cruizers, as would render them entirely 
master of that great bay;'' yet it was evacuated ! Had 
the British army been at Portsmouth, the wind was fair 
enough for the British fleet to have proceeded to it, and to 
have taken up its anchorage in Hampton Roads ; but it 
was not fair to proceed to the mouth of the York River, 
during that day, as it was imagined by the writer of the 
Political Magazine, as has been already shown. That the 
fleet might have been better conducted into action 1 have 
admitted, but that more could have been done I doubt, and 
whether Cornwallis's army could have been brought away, 
had the Admiral been requested or instructed to do so, 
is a problem that no mortal, I believe, now can solve. 



LIST OF THE FLEETS. 



71 



LIST OF THE ENGLISH AND FRENCH FLEETS. 



BRITISH LINE OF BATTLE. 
Ships. Guns. Captains, fyc. 



FRENCH LINE OF BATTLE. 



Shrewsbury, 

Intrepid, 

Alcide, 

Princessa, 

Ajax 
Terrible, 
Europe, 
Montague, 
Royal Oak, 

London, 

Bedford, 

Resolution, 

America, 

Centaur, 

Monarch, 

Barfleur, 

Invincible, 

Belliqueux, 

Alfred, 



74, M. Robinson 
64, A.J.P. Molloy 
74, C. Thompson 
„ 5 Rear Adml. Drake 
/U '£C. Knatchbull 
74, N. Carrington 

W C. Finch 

S Child 

G. Bowen 

J. T. Ardesoife 
' ( Rear Adml. Graves 
yU > I D. Graves 
74, T. Graves 

Lord R. Manners 

S. Thompson 

J. N. Inglefield 

F. Reynolds 
Qn 5 Sir Sam. Hood, R. A. 

' \ Alexander Hood 
74, C. Saxton 
64, J. Brine 
74, W. Bayne 



74, 
64, 

74, 
74, 



74, 
64, 
74, 

74, 



One 50 and six frigates. 



Ships. 
Pluton, 
Marsellois, 
Bourgogne, 
Diadem, 
Reflechi, 
Auguste, 
St. Esprit, 
Caton, 
Cesar, 
Destin, 

La Ville de Paris, 
Victoire, 
Sceptre, 

Northumberland, 
Palmier, 
Solitaire, 
Citoyen, 
Scipion, 
Magnanime, 
Hercule, 
Languedoc, 
Zele 
Hector, 
Souverain, 



Guns. 
74, 
74, 
74, 
74, 
64, 
84, 
84, 
64, 
74, 
74, 

110, 
74, 
74, 
74, 
74, 
64, 
74, 
74, 
74, 
74, 
84, 
74, 
74, 
74. 



Admirals. 



Bougainville 



De Grasse 



Montiel 



Charon, 

*Guadaloupe 

Vulcan, 

Bonetta, 

Richmond, 

Iris, 

♦Loyalist, 



44 ,1 Bar 

,28,5-byp 
8,) the« 

14, t 

32. i 
32, £ 

14, S 



nt at York Town 
red hot shot from 
enemy's batteries 

14, taken with the army 

32. 



Le Glorieux, 
Le Valliant, 
Le Triton, 



74,} Blocking up 
64, > the York Ri- 
64, S ver. 



Le Due de Bourgogoe, 84,"^ "§ 



Captured by the 
French fleets. 



The Ships having this * before their 
names were ordered to cruize off the 
Capes to give intelligence to the Ad- 
miral of De Grasse's arrival. 



Le Neptune 
Le Conquerant, 
L' Ardent 
L' Eveille 
Le Jason 
Le Province 
Le Sagettaire 

L' Experiment, 50, 
and two frigates, 



74, 
74, J 
64, L 
64, [ 
64, I 

64, : 

54,'J 



I— - 1 rS 
o J* 



S' ra 



Blocking up the 
James River. 



72 EXPLANATION OF THE PLATE. 



EXPLANATION OF THE PLATE OF THE CHESAPEAK. 



A. The position of the French fleet at anchor. 

B.B. The British fleet at half past 2 p. m., the van bearing down in succession. 

F. The French fleet, the centre and rear edging away. 

C. The Middle-ground. 

D. The Horse-shoe sand. 

E.E. The " strong position" according to the writer in the " Political Maga- 
zine" for the British fleet to have anchored in. 

G.G.G. The position taken up by the French fleet after the action. 

H. York spit ; nineteen miles from York Town. 

J.J. The position of the French fleet at anchor according to Mr. Clerk and Rear 
Admiral Ekins, on the morning of the 5th of September. 

N. Norfolk in ruins. 

P. Portsmouth. 

O. Old Point Comfort. 

R. Hampton Roads. 

N. B. The variation of the compass was one degree westerly ', and the ebb tide 
began to make at noon. 

The Plate would not admit of the four headmost French ships being iaciuded 
in it j but their positions may be easily imagined , 




X 




^ ^ ^ ^ ^ 



^ 







Janus ^^ 



ver 




% % 



fe% 



LL= 



- : 



SIR SAMUEL HOODS ACTIONS, 



AT ST. CHRISTOPHERS. 



SIR SAMUEL HOOD'S ACTIONS, 



AT ST. 



When the Comte de Grasse had completed his in- 
tended operations in the Chesapeak, he detached a 
squadron of seven or eight sail of the line to Hispaniola, 
to escort the trade to Europe ; * and with twenty-nine 
he proceeded to Martinique, where he arrived on the 26th 
of November, 1781. 

Sir Samuel Hood, with nineteen sail of the line, left 
Sandy-Hook on the 11th of November, to return to his 
station, in order to watch, with so inferior a force, the 
French admiral. He arrived at Barbadoes on the 5th of 
January, when he found the St. Albans, of 64 guns, lately 
arrived from England to reinforce his squadron.f The 
opportune arrival of this squadron, small as it was, pre- 
vented the Comte de Grasse from prosecuting his intended 



*It appears that the French Admiral had detained the trade bound to 
France, at Cape Frangois, ever since the preceding July, in order that he 
might keep his fleet entire to act in the Chesapeak. If the British govern- 
ment had sanctioned, or a British Admiral had adopted such a measure, 
however necessary to carry an important political operation, the one would 
have been turned out, and the other would have been hung : no wonder that 
they succeeded and we failed. 

f The French Admiral at the same time was in daily expectation of twelve 
sail of the line, to reinforce his already superior fleet. The French were acting 
on the grand scale in America, while we were keeping our ships at home 
literally doing nothing ; except occasionally relieving the garrison at 
Gibraltar, for which purpose, and to calm the fears of John Bull, all our 
best ships were treasured up. 



76 hood's actions 

attack upon that Island — a measure which he relinquished 
the moment he heard of Sir Samuel Hood's arrival. 

On the 14th of January, the Admiral left it to proceed 
to Antigua, having been informed that the French arma- 
ment had changed its destination, and was seen steering 
for St. Christopher's. On his passage, Sir Samuel Hood 
was joined by the Russel, which had been under repair 
at English Harbour, Antigua, ever since the action with 
De Grasse, off Martinique, in the preceding April;* and 
by the Prudent, an old and very defective 64 gun ship, 
from the North American station, where she had been in- 
capable of service for several months, in consequence of 
the injury she had sustained in the action fought between 
Admiral Arbuthnot and Mons. D'Estouches, in the month 
of March, in the preceding year. 

These circumstances are occasionally adverted to, in 
order to show the reader the sort of tools with which 
British Admirals had to work in that unfortunate war, 
and to enable the young tactician to form a more correct 
judgment on the exertions of the officers of that day, than 
too many of the productions of the present will afford 
him the means of obtaining. 

The British fleet, now augmented to twenty-two sail of 
the line, (six of which carried only 64 guns,f) anchored 
in St. John's road in the island of Antigua, on the after- 
noon of the 21st of January. Here Sir Samuel Hood 
was informed that the enemy had actually commenced 
their attack on the island of St. Christopher's, but he 
could procure no certain account of their force. The Ad- 
miral immediately communicated with General Prescott, 

* Had the disabled ships been sent to England to be repaired, and others 
sent out to supply their place, much would have been saved in every way 
to the nation. 

t Ships of that class carried only 24 pounders on the gun-deck, while 74 
g«n ships mounted 32 pounders on the same deck : the French ships mostly 
carried thereon 36 pounders, equal in weight to 40 pounds English ;— cir- 
cumstances seldom noticed by Naval Historians. 



at st. Christopher's. 77 

the commander of the forces, and obtained from him 700 
men, who were embarked on board the frigates with all 
possible dispatch. With such inadequate means Sir 
Samuel Hood sailed from Antigua, on the 23rd of Janu- 
ary, to attempt, if it were possible, the relief of Brimstone- 
hill, the only fortress in the island of St. Christopher's 
capable of making the slightest resistance to the French 
army landed there, amounting to 9000 men, under the 
Marquis de Bouville. 

Before day-break of the 24th, as the fleet was sailing 
before the wind under top-sails and top-gallant-sails, the 
Nymph frigate, owing to the misconduct of the officer of 
the watch, very improperly hove-to right-a-head of the 
Alfred, the leading ship of the starboard division of the 
fleet, which ship, not perceiving or expecting such an un- 
officer-like proceeding on the part of the frigate, was 
actually on board of, and had nearly cut in two, the 
Nymph, ere any measures could be adopted in either ship 
to prevent such a catastrophe.* 

This apparently unfortunate accident compelled Sir 
Samuel Hood to arrest the progress of his fleet, in order 
to ascertain the extent of the injury sustained by the 
Alfred, and the possibility of repairing it at sea. The 
troops were removed from the frigate, her damages re- 
quiring her return to Antigua to be repaired. Upon in- 
vestigation it was found that the Alfred had carried away 
the knee of the head below the bob-stays, and had sus- 
tained some other trifling damage, but that her defects 
might be made good at sea, although to do so it would 
detain the fleet until the next day, when it was expected 
she might be rendered fit for service.- 

This accident was the source of much uneasiness to 
Sir Samuel Flood, whose ardent mind could but ill brook 



* The officer of the watch, on board the Nymph, died a Lieutenant, al- 
though extremely well connected, and although he served in the subsequent 
war. 



78 hood's actions 

delay when the service of his country required prompti- 
tude and exertion. But the allotted period of the humi- 
liation and degradation of Britain having elapsed, and a 
brighter dawn beginning to break upon her operations,* 
what was then a subject of regret, proved to have been 
the work of a superintending Providence, to effect what 
in all probability would not have been accomplished, had 
not this seeming mis-chance occurred — the correction of 
an enemy whose arrogance, the result of a successful war- 
fare of nearly four years, had expanded to the utmost verge 
of its possible extension; and which, but for this occur- 
rence, might not have met" the chastisement it merited : for 
had the French fleet been attacked at anchor, the result of 
the battle might have been very different. 

In the course of the morning (the 24th January,) his 
Christian Majesty's cutter, L'Espion, was captured on 
her way to Basse-terre, having shells, &c. on board for the 
French army investing Brimstone-Hill. 

The fleet was obliged to continue to lay-to throughout 
the whole of the 24th, in order to effect the repairs of the 
Alfred, where all the carpenters of the fleet were collected 
together for that purpose. In the mean time the Com- 
mander-in-Chief was occupied in making a new disposi- 
tion of his fleet, in consequence of its leading ship being 
incapable of continuing in her station in the line. In lieu 
of that ship the St. Albans, Captain Inglis, was ordered 
to lead, and the Alfred to take her station in the rear. 
The flag officers were also called on board, as was Captain 
Inglis, to communicate to them the plan of operations 
contemplated, under the various circumstances contingent 
on the movements of the enemy's fleet. 

Towards the evening, the look-out frigates made the 
signal that the enemy's fleet was standing out from Basse- 
terre road, St. Christopher's. 

* This happy change in the aspect of affairs Mr. Clerk arrogates to him- 
self, instead of ascribing it to Kim who directs all things here below. 



at ST. Christopher's. 79 

On the morning of the 25th, the French fleet was seen 
a long way to leeward, standing out from Basse-terre, 
with the larboard tacks on-board. At ten o'clock, the Al- 
fred's damages being sufficiently repaired to proceed on 
service, the signal was made to fill, and to form in line 
a-head, on the starboard tack ; the French fleet was then 
directly to leeward, and still on the larboard, or opposite 
tack to that of the British ; the isle of Nevis being on the 
lee-bow of the former. The signal was then made for the 
division of Rear Admiral Drake, who commanded in the 
van, to fill, and make a demonstration of proceeding to 
Basse-terre. This was only meant as a feint by Sir Samuel 
Hood, to perplex his adversary, who immediately tacked 
his fleet, to prevent the intended movement. Sir Samuel 
Hood then recalled Rear Admiral Drake's division, and 
brought to, as if determined to await the combat. 

This so completely deceived De Grasse, that he again 
tacked, and continued to stand to the southward, doubt- 
less in the expectation of the wind veering round to that 
point of the compass, as the day advanced, and which 
would have enabled him to have laid up for the British 
fleet, when he again tacked to stand to the northward. 

Here we perceive a display of tactics hitherto un- 
practised by one of the parties, at least, and carried into 
execution by a British Admiral, before any one of Mr. 
Clerk's printed papers on Naval Tactics could possibly 
have reached the West Indies, 

Sir Samuel Hood again summoned to him the Captain 
of the St. Albans, in order to communicate some further 
instructions, and to furnish him with his own pilot, who 
was well acquainted with the position of the bank, on the 
edge of which Sir Samuel Hood intended to anchor his 
fleet, in order to prevent the enemy anchoring outside him. 

It does not appear to have been conceived by De Grasse, 
that Sir Samuel Hood, with a fleet so inferior in point of 



80 hood's actions. 

numbers to his own, would attempt to proceed to the an- 
chorage he had quitted. 

The British fleet continued to lay-to with their heads to 
the shore, or to the northward, while that of France con- 
tinued standing out, or to the southward. This anxious 
moment of awful suspense, between the hope of being- 
able to gain the anchorage, and the expectation of being 
compelled to fight on unequal terms a superior enemy 
under sail , is finely pourtrayed by Sir Samuel Hood in 
his public letter, wherein he says, 

"Would the event of a battle have determined the fate 
of the island, I would without hesitatu " e attackec 
the enemy,* from a knowledge how mm 
pected from an English squadron, com 
among whom is no other contention, th id be 

most forward in rendering service to his Mr g and cot; 
herein I placed the utmost confidence, and should not, 
trust, have been disappointed"^ 

At one o'clock the French fleet having got tc ^ con 
siderable distance from the land, the signal was made for 
the fleet to fill, and to form in a line a-head one cable's 
length asunder. No sooner was the line formed, than the 
signal was made to the St. Albans to bear away, and lead 
the fleet to the appointed rendezvous — Basse-terre road ; 
keeping the Nevis bhore close on-board, in order to pre- 
vent the French fleet from getting within them. This was 
complied with so completely to the letter, that the Solebay 
was wrecked from not having room to pass between the 
line of battle ship she was a-breast of, and the western 
point of Nevis. 



* The remaining passages of the above paragraph are most unaccountably 
suppressed by a late nautical writer. 

f Thus it was that the immortal Nelson always reasoned. Little can be 
hoped from the operations of a fleet in which there is no mutual confidence 
between the Commander and those under his command. 



at st. Christopher's. 81 

De Grasse appears to have beheld this with astonish- 
ment, and as if doubtful whether it were a second feint, or 
a movement intended to be followed up by the British 
Admiral, he seemed uncertain how to act. But when he 
perceived the whole fleet following their gallant leader, he 
tacked his fleet together* that being the most expeditious 
method of retrieving the error he had committed, that of 
standing so far out to sea, and of intercepting the march 
of his sagacious opponent : for had he tacked his fleet 
in succession from van to rear, so much time would have 
been lost that his van ship would not have reached the 
stern-most ship of the British fleet, until she had got to 
the anchorage. 

In consequence of the Comte de Grasse having tacked 
his fleet together, as before intimated, the French fleet 
approached within gun shot, at a little before 3 o'clock : 
it being on the starboard tack, although formed on the 
larboard line, of bearing i. e. in a bow and quarter line. 
De Grasse, who was in the centre of his line, fetched, in 
the Ville de Paris, nearly a-breast of the Canada, while 
the head-most ship of his fleet was drawing in a-breast of 
Sir Samuel Hood's ship, the Barfleur. 

Their van ship boldly advanced towards the Barfleur, 
who reserved her fire until the brave Frenchman ap- 
proached within musket shot, when she opened such a 
well directed, and quickly repeated fire, that in a few 
minutes, the French ship had her jib-boom shot away, her 
sails nearly cut into ribbands, and her rigging so cut up, 



* This the planter in his excellent account of this business, very naturally 
described it thus : — " The French immediately bore down diagonally towards 
our centre ;" which expression the author of " Naval Battles'* thus explains 
in a note. " This must be intended for * hauled up,' the French fleet being to 
leeward." As the observer was not a seaman, he might not know the dis- 
tinction. Had the French only " hauled up," they might as well have put 
on their night-caps. 

I 



82 hood's actions 

that she quickly put her helm a- weather, and bore away 
from her redoubted antagonist.* 

De Grasse ? perceiving an opening in our line between 
the Canada and Prudent, in consequence of the inferior 
sailing of the latter ship, boldly attempted to sever it, and 
thereby cut off the Prudent, Montagu, Alfred, and Ame- 
rica ; but Cornwallis, with his accustomed promptitude, 
threw his after sails a-back, and thereby placed himself in 
the breach, which he so nobly defended, that his gigantic 
opponent was glad to relinquish the hazardous enterprise, 
either through apprehension of himself being cut off, or of 
the Ville de Paris getting a-ground, should the attempt be 
persevered in.f 

The gallant conduct of Captain Cornwallis was imme- 
diately followed .by Commodore Affleck in the Bedford, 
and Lord Robert Manners in the Resolution, who also 
threw all a-back, by which, time was given to the Prudent 
and Alfred, &c, to recover their relative position in the 
line, and other ships of the enemy, of easier draft of 
water than the Ville de Paris, were prevented from at- 
tempting to break through the interval occasioned by the 
Prudent* s bad sailing. Sir Samuel Hood looked on undis- 
mayed at this attack upon his rear, knowing that he 
could confide in every individual Captain ; and very coolly 
ordered the signal to be made for the ships a-head to make 
more sail, in order to hasten their anchoring as much as 
possible. In the mean time the St. Albans had taken up 
her station, and anchored at 3 p. m. just within Green- 



* A tolerable proof of the dexterity of our seamen in the use of the great 
gun, although then unassisted by locks or sights, to aid their aim or accele- 
rate their operatiou. 

1 1 have been informed by a brother officer who was in one of the ships 
that had just anchored, that for a moment he could perceive the Ville de 
Paris's jib on the inside of the British line. Had our fleet been situated as 
represented by Mr. Clerk and Rear Admiral Ekins, in their extraordinary 
plates of this action, the above four ships would have been cut off. 



AT ST. CHRISTOPHER S. S3 

point, but not quite so near to it as was intended, and 
the other ships did the same in succession, while the 
centre and rear were closely engaged with the enemy, who 
pressed them close until every ship was anchored,* when 
the French wore in succession and stood out to sea, where 
we will leave them to their own reflections for the present, 
that the true position of the British fleet may be exhibited 
to the view of the reader, who, if his knowledge of it has 
been only obtained from the works and plates of Mr. 
Clerk, and Rear Admiral Ekins, can have no idea what- 
ever of its actual position. 

In the first place instead of anchoring nineteen ships in 
a straight line, as by these writers they are most unac- 
countably represented, having the Alfred, Canada, and 
Resolution, placed at a right angle thereto, and a-breast 
of the centre ship in the British line, where they could 
have been of no earthly use, and would have been exposed 
to the enemy's fire without the possibility of returning a 
shot, and could not have contributed to prevent the French 
fleet from anchoring close to the town of Basse-terre, 
Sir Samuel Hood, in the most judicious and seaman-like 
manner, anchored his ships in an irregular curve from the 
head-most ship to the twelfth in the line, whence in con- 
formity with the edge of the bank, the line assumed the 
form of a semi-crescent, without the slightest interruption 
from the first to the last ship in the whole line. 

But before I proceed further, it will be necessary to ob- 
serve that the Admiral, perceiving the St. Albans had not 
anchored near enough to the shore, ordered the Bedford, 
Russel, and Montagu, from the rear to anchor a-head of 
that ship, which effectually shut out the approach of the 
French fleet in that direction. 



* The moment each sliip struck soundings on the edge of the bank, she 
immediately anchored— how then could the French fleet have anchored 
without them? 



84 hood's actions 

By these displays of genuine, untutored tactics, the 
British Admiral prevented his fleet being doubled with 
impunity, either at his van or rear ; nor could the enemy 
assail the main body of his fleet, except while under sail, 
which he well knew would not be very advantageous to 
them : as our ships, from having springs upon their cables, 
could, to a certain extent, concentrate or diffuse their fire 
at pleasure ; an advantage their adversaries could not 
possess while under way. 

During the night, some other movements were made to 
strengthen the rear ; one or two ships having anchored so 
very near to the edge of the bank, that a sudden squall 
caused their anchors to drop off it. An order also was 
given that any injury sustained from the enemy during 
the day, should be repaired while darkness shrouded them 
from their view. Owing to this judicious arrangement, 
the enemy knew not the extent of injury inflicted by them.* 

Having placed the fleet securely at anchor, I shall now 
inform the reader of Sir Samuel Hood's intended mode of 
attack, had the Comte de Grasse retained his original 
position in Basse-terre road. 

Had the French fleet remained at anchor, which they 
might have done, without "feeling their situation disad- 
vantageous," as it has been asserted by a naval writer,f 
it was Sir Samuel Hood's intention to have made an attack 
upon them in the following manner. 'The van ship was 
to stand on till a-breast of the van ship of the enemy, as 
per course indicated in the order previously issued at 
St. John's Road, Antigua ; and after having delivered eaeh 
ship her whole fire upon the two headmost ships of the 



* These useful hints are thrown out as much for the benefit of the young 
sea officer, as to do honor to the genius that originated them. 

i See " Naval Battles." Admiral Byron, after the battle off Grenada, was 
attacked there by D'Estaing, the former having only 20, while the latter had 
26 ships ; whereas De Grasse had 29 to 22 ships of the line : perhaps Rear 
Admiral Ekins was not aware of this circumstance. 



at st. Christopher's. 85 

enemy, to haul off in succession, as per course indicated ; 
and then, by tacking, to return in the same succession, and 
again, and again, to repeat each ship her whole fire.'* 

On the morning of the 26th, at half-past eight, the 
French fleet was seen coming, as close as possible, round 
Nevis Point, in compact and regular order, intending to 
attempt a passage between Green Point, and the Bedford* 
now the headmost ship in the British line. But, so sin- 
gularly felicitous was the position taken up by .the British 
Admiral, that when the enemy's leading shipf approached 
Green Point, the wind headed her, so that she could not 
fetch above the third ship in our line. The springs of our 
van ships were so admirably attended to, that the broad- 
sides of four of them were brought to bear at the same time 
upon the unfortunate Frenchman, and were opened with 
tremendous effect, when the wind headed him, which it did 
when he got the length of Green Point. 

The crash occasioned by their destructive broadsides 
was so tremendous on board the Pluton, that whole pieces 
of plank were seen flying from her off-side, ere she could 
escape the cool concentrated fire of her determined adver- 
saries. This ship being more distinctly marked as she 
proceeded along the British line, received the first fire of 
every ship in passing. She was, indeed, in so shattered a 
state, as to be compelled to bear away for St. Eustatius ; 
it was even asserted that she struck her colours, but that 
was denied on their part. The French ships generally 
approached the British van with more caution, and bore 
away sooner than their leader had done, with the exception 
of a few, among whom the Ville de Paris was one. De 
Grasse, in order to prolong the individual encounter as 
much as possible, counter-braced his after yards, in order 



* Clerk's Tactics. The above plan of attack is dot given by the author of 
" Naval Battles," which is somewhat singular. 

i Supposed to be the Pluton, whose Captain gave during the war repeated 
proofs of valour. 



86 hood's actions. 

to retard his ship's way through the water while running 
with the wind on the starboard quarter, along the British 
line. But as he hauled to the wind in rounding the British 
rear, where it formed the inner horn of the crescent, these 
sails, from becoming more a-back, detained the French 
Admiral a considerable time a-breast of the Resolution* 
Prudent, Canada, and Alfred, in succession, as the Ville 
de Paris slowly forged a-head, and fired upon them: in 
this De Grasse was supported by those ships which were 
a-stern, or immediately a-head of him. During this short 
buttremendous conflict between the respective combatants, 
in that part of the field of battle, nothing whatever could 
be seen of them for upwards of twenty minutes, save De 
Grasse's white flag at the main-top gallant-mast-head of 
the Ville de Paris, gracefully floating above the immense 
volume of smoke that enveloped them, or the pendants of 
those ships which were occasionally perceptible when an 
increase of breeze would waft away the smoke that had 
screened them from our ardent gaze. 

In the afternoon of the same day, the French made a 
second attack on our line. It commenced at fifty minutes 
past two, and was principally directed against the centre 
and rear — the morning attack having convinced them 
that the British van was not to be asailed with impunity. 

The damage sustained by the enemy's fleet was of that 
nature, that when they stood towards us the next day, men 
were seen over very many of their ships' sides, for the pur- 
pose of stopping the numerous shot-holes that were very 
visible. And the Ville de Paris had received some be- 
tween wind and water, so low as to be obliged to be heeled 
at least three streaks to windward when standing off on 
the larboard tack, she having engaged on the starboard 
side in the three attacks, above described. 

Never perhaps was a superior enemy so completely 
foiled as De Grasse was upon this occasion. He had 
doubtless calculated upon playing the old French game of 



at st. Christopher's. 87 

crippling his adversary's ships, by keeping at long shot 
distance, as had been the practice of their fleets through- 
out the war ; and by which ours would have been com- 
pelled to return into port: but now they had to encounter 
one whose head was not filled with theoretic tactics, but 
with a profound knowledge of his profession, as well as 
of the men whom he had the honour to command, and on 
whom he knew he could rely in the moment of difficulty 
or danger. 

Sir Samuel Hood not only secured his fleet from any 
assault by sea, but also took measures to prevent the 
enemy from molesting it from the land, where it was in- 
finitely more vulnerable : — for could they have thrown up 
any batteries, on the hill situated above Green Point, his 
position would have been no longer tenable. To prevent 
such an attempt on the part of the enemy he landed the 
troops that accompanied the fleet in Frigate's Bay, where 
they took post on the eminence that commanded the nar- 
row neck which unites the southern point of St. Christo- 
pher's with the main island. The troops in landing had a 
skirmish with the Irish brigade, whom they drove before 
them, and from whom they took some prisoners. 

Sir Samuel Hood offered to land two battalions of 
marines, amounting to fourteen hundred men, together 
with the 69th regiment, serving as marines, which force 
with that brought from Antigua, would have amounted to 
two thousand four hundred men. With these he proposed 
to attack the French posts at Basse-terre, in order to 
create a diversion in favour of the British Garrison de- 
fending Brimstone-hill. The offer of the marines, as well 
as the proposed attack was declined by General Prescott, 
because he did not think it practicable to maintain a post 
in that position.* 

The enemy's fleet made frequent demonstrations of at- 

* See Beatson's Naval and Military Memoirs. 



88 hood's actions 

tacking us, but never come near enough to engage. On 
the 12th of February their fleet amounted to thirty-one 
ships of the line, a strong reinforcement from France un- 
der the Marquis de Vaudreuil having joined, which not 
only supplied the place of their disabled ships, but con- 
tributed to swell their numbers. On the 13th, the Comte 
de Grasse, despairing of being able to assail with any 
prospect of advantage, our little fleet of twenty-two ships, 
prudently anchored under Nevis. 

Although Mr. Clerk's account of this affair be not 
strictly correct in all its parts, yet every credit is given by 
him to the professional abilities of the Admiral who com- 
manded, and to the officers and men who served under 
him. To be sure, in the preface to his second edition, he 
distantly hints, that the account of this achievement 
arrived in England soon after he had published his " fifty 
copies" of the "Attack from the Windward," when "our 
affairs took/' he says, " a different turn ; and I have since 
had the satisfaction to see, by the adoption of my system, 
a decided and permanent superiority given to our fleets ;"*. 
thus modestly leaving it open to the reader either to at- 
tribute to him or not, as he may think proper, the merit of 
having suggested the plan so ably executed by Sir Samuel 
Hood. But as it does not appear that he ever went to 
Portsmouth to communicate his ideas to that officer, who 
was Commissioner at that Dock-yard, previous to his being 
sent to the West Indies ; and as the above fifty copies of 
his work which were published on the 1st of January, 1782, 
could not have reached Sir Samuel Hood in the West 
Indies in time to have enabled him to profit by it, as the 
action took place on the 25th of the same month, it is more 
than probable that he never saw it. 



* Clerk's Tactics, p. xiii. I am at a loss to know what naval action during 
the late wars was fought upon Mr. Clerk's system, unless it be that off St. 
Vincent, which may be said to possess some affinity with his general plan of 
attack from the leeward. 



at. st. christophkr's. 89 

But yet Mr. Clerk's work possesses much valuable 
matter, displays much genius and persevering industry, 
notwithstanding there be some small share of vanity 
occasionally exhibited in the preface. 

Rear Admiral Ekins in his " observations" on this 
brilliant affair says, " had the Comte de Grasse possessed 
the talents and enterprise of his opponent, he would have 
made him pay dearly for having with a force so inferior, 
taken up Jthe anchorage so lately occupied by the French 
fleet; and which, 'feeling the situation disadvantageous/ 
they had quitted." 

As well might it have been said of the glorious battle 
of Waterloo, that had the French troops, commanded 
by Bonaparte, possessed the physical power of those 
commanded by the great Wellington, they would have 
ob tained the victory ; and admitting that such an assertion 
might be strictly correct, yet no one would give the 
historian credit for liberality of sentiment, or generosity 
of feeling, who would so coldly or so negatively commend 
the hero, who, under Providence, which fitted him and his 
valiant band for the mighty conflict they were to be en- 
gaged in, had achieved the most brilliant and the most 
important victory by land, which the annals of modern 
times will have to transmit to an admiring 1 and a grateful 
posterity. 

But to return to the subject in hand — it is much to be 
regretted, with a reference to the benefit of young officers, 
that the author of "Naval Battles" had not supplied the 
lack of "talent" which he considers De Grasse to have 
been deficient in, by demonstrating to the satisfaction of 
the intelligent naval reader the possibility, or rather the 
practicability of the French Admiral having " made him 
(Sir Samuel Hood) pay dearly for having taken up the an- 
chorage so lately occupied by the French fleet." 

Does the gallant author conceive that he has done so 
by merely advancing the following hypothesis — '■' The 



90 hood's actions 

French Admiral should have made his attack upon the van, 
by anchoring against it in double force, and on the outside 
of his enemy?*' If he do, he must surely have forgotten the 
reception the French leading ship experienced in the 
morning attack of the 26th, which is so graphically de- 
scribed in the " Planter's Journal " given by himself, as 
well as what he himself quotes from an anonymous writer 
— viz. that Sir Samuel Hood anchored his fleet " so nearly 
upon the edge of the bank, that the enemy's fleet could not 
anchor without it." 

The same writer also says that " De Grasse quitted the 
anchorage, feeling the situation disadvantageous." Had 
he been better acquainted with the naval history of that 
war, he would have been aware that in the identical situ- 
ation which the French fleet had occupied* previous to 
its going out to encounter the British fleet, Admiral 
Byron, on the same spot, with 20 sail of the line, beat off 
the Comte D'Estaing, having 26. The French attack was 
feeble and not persevered in ; because, says Matthews, 
"irom the advantageous situation of the British fleet, they 
would have suffered greatly:" hence we may conclude 
that the Comte de Grasse did not quit Basse-terre " from 
feeling the situation disadvantageous," but because he 
thought by being under sail, that he could out-manoeuvre 
the British Admiral, whose tactics he appears to have 
under-rated. 

So negligent had the governor and council of the island 
been, and so little prepared were they to resist a sudden at- 
tack from the enemy, whom perhaps they as little expected, 
that upon their landing, no less than twelve brass 24- 
pounders, and two 13-inch mortars with their proper car- 
riages and beds, with 1500 shells, and 6000 24- pound shot, 
were found by the enemy at the foot of Brimstone-hill, 



* But which was not the situation in which Sir Samuel Hood anchored his 
fleet, because Basse-terre was then in the possession of the enemy. 



at st. Christopher's. 91 

where they had been suffered to remain twelve months, 
although Sir George Rodney, previous to his return to 
England on leave, had urged the council to place the 
cannon, &c. in the fort, and General Grant had given di- 
rections to that effect; yet no inquiry appears to have 
been instituted, or punishment of any kind inflicted on the 
offender. 

On the morning of the 13th of February, De Grasse 
anchored his fleet, which then amounted to thirty three 
sail of the line, off Nevis. 

On the 14th a flag of truce arrived, giving the unwel- 
come intelligence of Brimstone-hill having surrendered. 
This induced Sir Samuel Hood to quit the anchorage, 
which he did at ten o'clock that night, unobserved or un- 
molested by the enemy. 

The French, at day-light, perceiving that the British 
fleet had left the anchorage, weighed, and took up their 
former station off Basse-terre. 



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92* 



LIST OF THE BRITISH FLEET. 



A list of the British fleet, under the command of Rear 
Admiral Sir Samuel Hood, Bart., as they lay at anchor 
in Basse-terre Road, St. Christopher's. 

The number against each ship has a reference to that against each 
ship in the Plates given herewith. 



No. Ships. 


Guns. Captains. 


Flag Officers. 


1 Bedford, 


74, Graves, 


Commodore Affleck ^ These ships 


2 Russel, 

3 Montague, 


74, Stanhope, 
74, Bower, 


f were in the 
£"rear in go- 
3 ing in. 


4 St. Albans, 


64, Inglis, 




5 Aleide, 


74, C. Thompson, 




6 America 


64, S. Thompson, 




7 Intrepid 


64, Molloy 




8 Torbay, 


74, Gedoin 




9 Princessa, 


70, Knatchbull, 


Rear Admiral Drake. 


10 Prince George, 


90, Williams, 




11 Ajax, 


74, Carrington, 




12 Prince William, 


64, Wilkinson, 




13 Shrewsbury, 


74, West, 




14 Invincible, 


74, Saxton, 




15 Barfleur 


90, Knight, 


Sir Samuel Hood, Bart. 


16 Monarch, 


74, Reynolds, 




17 Centaur 


74, Inglefield, 


' 


18 Reliqueux 


64, Sutherland, 




19 Resolution, 


74, Lord Robert Manners, 


20 Prudent, , 


64, Barclay, 




21 Canada, 


74, Hon. W. Coruwallis, 


22 Alfred, 


74, Baynes. 





LIST OF THE FRENCH FLEET. 



93* 



List of the French fleet, under Comte de Grasse 5 at 
St. Christopher's. 





Ships. 


Guns. 


1 


La Ville de Paris, 


110, 


2 


L'Auguste 


84, 


3 


Le Due de Bourgogne, 


84, 


4 


Le Languedoc, 


84, 


5 


La Couronne, 


84, 


6 


Le Neptune, 


74, 


7 


Le Zele, 


74, 


8 


Le Glorieux, 


74, 


9 


Le Citoyen, 


74, 


10 


Le Souverain, 


74, 


11 


Le Magnanime, 


74, 


12 


Le Cesar, 


74, 


13 


L' Hector, 


74, 


14 


Le Pluton, 


74, 


15 


L 1 Hercule, 


74, 


16 


Le Scipion, 


74, 


17 


Le Bourgogne, 


74, 


18 


Le Dauphin Royal, 


74, 


19 


Le Magnifique, 


74, 


20 


Le Sceptre, 


74, 


21 


Le Northumberland, 


74, 


22 


Le Conquerant, 


74, 


23 


Le Marseillois, 


74, 


24 


Le Palmier, 


74, 


25 


Le Ardent, 


64, 


26 


L' Eville 


64, 


27 


L' Etonne, 


64, 


28 


Le Jason, 


64, 


29 


Le Reflechi, 


64, 


30 


Le Triomphant, 


84, 


31 


Le Brave, 


74, 


32 


Le Bien Aim6, 


74, 


33 


Le Minotaur, 


74, 


34 


Le Fier, 


54, 



Le Comte de Grasse, Admiral, 

Mons. de Bougainville, Rear Admiral. 



These Ships arrived from France under 
■Monsieur Vaudreuil, after the actions with 
i Sir Samuel Hood. 

! Ditto Anne en flotte. 



ADMIRAL RODNEY'S ACTIONS 



OF THE 



NINTH AND TWELFTH OF APRIL, 

1782. 



ADMIRAL RODNEY'S ACTIONS 

OF THE 
NINTH AND TWELFTH OF APRIL, 

1782. 



Admiral Sir George B. Rodney, after having 
formed a junction with Sir Samuel Hood, proceeded to 
Gros-Islet-Bay, St. Lucia, where he wooded and watered 
his fleet preparatory to his proceeding off Fort-Royal 
Harbour, Martinique, where the Comte de Grasse, with 
^thirty-four sail of the line, two 50-gun ships, and several 
frigates, was making the necessary preparations to escort a 
convoy of transports, having troops on board, to Saint 
Domingo, for the purpose of making an attack on the 
island of Jamaica, in conjunction with the forces of the 
king of Spain, who were to be in readiness to join so 
soon as this armament reached the island of Hispaniola. 

Sir George Rodney had in the mean time stationed 
frigates to watch the enemy's motions, and to give him the 
earliest intelligence of their quitting that anchorage. 

On the morning of the 8th of April, the Andromache 
frigate, Captain George Anson Byron, was discovered 
with signals flying, to inform the Admiral of the French 
fleet having sailed from Fort-Royal Bay. The Admiral 
immediately made the signal for all boats and persons to 
repair on board their respective ships, a very necessary 



96 Rodney's actions of the 

signal, as most of the ships had their boats on shore to 
complete their water, &c. Shortly after, the signal was 
made for the fleet to weigh, outermost and leeward-most 
ships tirst, and then to chase in the N.E.* quarter. By 
twelve o'clock every ship was out of the bay, and carrying 
a press of sail to overtake the enemy, whom they had no 
doubt of coming up with, as their men-of-war were de- 
layed by the transports which accompanied them. Sir 
George Rodney commanded the white or centre division, 
Sir Samuel Hood the red or van division, and Rear Admiral 
Francis Samuel Drake the blue or rear division ; and 
although the signal to chase was thrown out to- stimulate 
every one to exertion, yet the respective divisions were to 
keep as much as possible together so as to be able to form 
into line whenever it might be required. 

In the course of the afternoon the fleet passed close by 
Fort Royal Harbour, but not a single ship of the enemy 
was to be seen there. At sun-set some of the French 
ships were seen from our mast heads to the northward, 
and in the course of the night their lights were discernible 
from the deck. At day-light, on the morning of the 9th, we 
had gained on the enemy, who appeared to be very much 
scattered ; fourteen line of battle ships, having two flags 
among them, were between Dominica and the Saints, and 
had a good breeze from the E. N. E., while the remainder 
were becalmed under the land, about St. Rupert's Bay, 
with the exception of one straggler, who was also be- 
calmed in the N. W. quarter, and at some distance from 
the other part of their fleet. 

At half-past seven a. m. Sir Samuel Hood's division, 
being a-head, got the breeze, while the centre and rear 
divisions continued to be becalmed under the high land of 
Dominica. This of course separated the former from the 
latter; however, Sir Samuel Hood continued to pursue the 

* See the note in page 21. 



NINTH AND TWELFTH OF APRIL. 97 

fourteen ships of the enemy that were in possession of 
the breeze, with. only eight ships of his own division. 

The ship seen in the N.W. having got the breeze at the 
same time with our van division, boldly stood for, and en- 
deavoured to weather, the British advanced ships, that 
being the only way to regain her own fleet then to windward. 
To such a length did she carry her audacity that she com- 
pelled the Alfred, the headmost ship of Sir Samuel Hood's 
division, to bear up in order to allow her to pass. Every 
eye was fixed on the bold Frenchman, with the exception 
of those who were anxiously looking out on the Com- 
mander in Chief to make the signal to engage, but who 
most likely from not supposing it could be an enemy, 
did not throw out the ardently looked for signal, and 
therefore not a gun was fired. This is mentioned to 
shew the state of discipline on board the ships composing 
Sir Samuel Hood's division, and that he, though second in 
command, would not fire a single shot until directed to 
do so by his Commander-in-Chief.* 

As soon as this ship had got out of the reach of the 
guns of the Barfleur, the flag ship of Sir Samuel Hood^ 
she hoisted her colours, and a flag at the mizen-top-gal- 
lant-mast-head, and hauled up her lower deck ports, as if 
rejoicing at her fortunate escape. The gallant conduct of 
this ship was the admiration of every one who had the 
pleasure to behold the determined perseverance and 
presence of mind of her commander, in adopting the 
only possible mode of regaining his fleet. 

At half-past nine, that part of the French fleet which 
was in possession of the breeze bore down upon, and en- 

* It is more than probable that Sir Samuel Hood's reason for having waited 
for the signal to engage from his Commander-in-Chief ere he would fire upon 
the above French ship, arose from the supposition that had he been the oc. 
casion of prematurely bringing on an action under the above circumstances, 
he would have been responsible for its results : for this he, no doubt, will be 
blamed by those who find it much easier to point out the errors of others, than 
to act correctly themselves. 
L 



yo RODNEY S ACTIONS OF THE 

gaged, Sir Samuel Hood's isolated division, which then 
consisted of only eight ships. 

In order to prevent the further separation of this division 
from the main body of the fleet, Sir Samuel Hood directed 
it by signal to bring-to.* The Comte de Grasse, whose 
talents have been under-rated by a late professional 
writer, made his attack upon this division in a most sea- 
man-like manner, and in perfect conformity with the rules 
of practical tactics. Each ship bore down to engage in 
rotation, then passed on a-head, tacked, and again fell 
into the rear, in order to keep up a regular combat with 
fresh ships. As soon as the breeze reached the other 
ships of this division, they came up under a press of sail 
to support their gallant Commander. Among the rest was 
the Royal Oak, whose crew, while passing under the lee of 
the Barfleur, filled the lower-top-mast and top-gallant 
rigging, to give their Admiral three cheers. 

She had not been long in her station in the van, when 
the head of her main-mast was shot away, and with it 
went of course her main-top-mast, &c. 

Commodore Affleck also, although one of the centre 
division, came up under a crowd of sail to support his 
old Commander the moment he got the breeze. 

At half-past eleven, a partial air of wind from theS.E. 
enabled part of Sir George Rodney's division to approach 
the stern-most ships of the enemy, and he immediately 
commenced an engagement with as many of them as the 
wind allowed him to bring within the range of his guns. 

Rear Admiral Drake also followed his Chief as soon as 
an air of wind enabled him to put his ships in motion. 

When the French Admiral perceived that these portions 
of the British fleet were approaching near enough to 
molest his operations on the British van, he very prudently 

* Perhaps it would have been better if Sir Samuel Hood had wore round 
and put his ship's head towards the main body of our fleet : but he possibly 
had good reasons for doing as he did. 




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NINTH AND TWELFTH OF APRIL. 99 

ordered his ships to keep their wind, when they tacked, 
after passing the Royal Oak the leading ship. 

In doing so, De Grasse prevented the meditated attempt 
of Admiral Rodney to interpose between the French ships 
so engaged with Sir Samuel Hood, and those that were to 
windward. 

From this time, that is about noon, the action became 
more desultory, until Be Grasse succeeded in drawing off 
his ships to windward. In this he was so successful that 
they were all out of the reach of shot at about half-past 
one, p. m. 

Captain Bayne, of the Alfred, lost his life in this his 
sixth encounter with the same enemy. 

The French, from holding a better wind than the ships of 
his Majesty, soon rejoined their convoy, which was a long 
way to windward. 

Thus it is perceptible to every experienced seaman, that 
Sir George Rodney did every thing that skill, intrepidity, 
and zeal could effect, to bring on a general battle with the 
fleet of France, and that the want of wind in the early 
part of the morning alone prevented him from accom- 
plishing his object. 

Some of the ships in Sir Samuel Hood's division were 
much injured in their masts and rigging, and many of 
the French ships were not more fortunate, as three of 
them were subsequently compelled to put into port, of 
which notice will be taken in its proper place. 

The above engagement is but slightly touched upon 
either by Mr. Clerk, or Rear Admiral Ekins, neither of 
whom appears to have had a clear conception of the mode 
of attack adopted by De Grasse on that occasion. Mr. 
Clerk, on what authority he does not state, asserts that 
the action in question did not continue more than an hour, 
when it is well known that it commenced at about half- 
past nine, and that the firing did not entirely cease until 
half-past one, 



100 Rodney's actions of the 

Rear Admiral Ekins, in his account of it, says that 
< ( Plate 18, fig-. 1, given in his work, describes the situa- 
tion of the two fleets on the 9th, wherein it would seem 
that some advantage might have been taken by the rear of 
the British fleet, had it hauled close to the wind" 

Rear Admiral Francis Samuel Drake never failed to 
keep close to the wind whenever an enemy was to wind- 
ward of him. That part of Sir George Rodney's public 
letter which the author of Ci Naval Battles" has omitted, 
will fully exonerate that gallant officer from any thing like 
censure on that day. 

" Their Lordships may easily imagine the mortification 
it must have been to the sixteen gallant officers command- 
ing the ships of the rear, who could only be spectators of 
an action in which it was not in their power to join, being 
detained by the calms under Dominique"* 

By inspecting the plates now given of this action, it will 
be seen that the rear division, as well as the centre, did 
keep close to the wind, as soon as they had a light air to 
enable them to do so ; and that every thing was done 
both by Sir George Rodney and Rear Admiral Drake, on 
that day, to support the van division, whenever a breeze 
of wind permitted them to put their ships in motion. 

But De Grasse having penetrated Admiral Rodney's 
intention of separating his fleet, directed his ships to 
keep their wind, and to discontinue the action, when they 
put about, after having passed the British van. Con- 
sequently, these ships when they had tacked to the 
southward, fetched so far to windward of the Formidable, 
as to be scarcely within reach of shot from Sir George 
Rodney's division in crossing it ; — and it was only those 
ships of the enemy which were still on the starboard tack, 
that Sir George Rodney could at all bring to action. 

* See Clerk's Tactics, p. 243. Extract from Sir G. Rodney's letter. 




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NINTH AND TWELFTH OF APRIL. 101 

From what has been said, the reader cannot, I should 
think, arrive at any other conclusion than this — that no ad- 
vantage was offered in that day's battle, to either the 
centre or rear division of the British fleet, that they did 
not avail themselves of to the utmost of their power ; and 
it is beyond a question that Sir George Rodney, had his 
wily enemy given him the opportuuity, would have cut in 
between the ships engaged with Sir Samuel Hood's 
division, and the rest of the French fleet, which but for his 
approach would have continued to make the circular 
attack on the British van division. 

It is too frequently the case in the accounts given of 
naval transactions which are compiled by landsmen, and 
perhaps naval authors themselves are not altogether ex- 
empt from the defect, that sufficient allowance is not made 
for the difference existing between different ships of the 
same class, and consequently one ship is considered by their 
readers as good as another. This relative difference between 
the ships composing the fleets of France and England seems 
to have been completely overlooked in all the narratives 
which have reached us of the events in question, although 
a due consideration of it is so necessary to a correct view 
of the movements of the respective fleets. The French 
naval architecture had attained a degree of excellence in 
the construction and capacity of the ships of that nation, 
which gave them serious advantages over us in point of 
sailing, either on a wind, or going large ; and from their 
having a greater depth of hold, they possessed a decided 
superiority in the most essential point of keeping a better 
wind. The fineness of their construction gave them im- 
portant, facilities in smooth water; hence in a fine weather 
climate, where nautical skill is not so frequently required 
as under our inconstant sky, and on our more boisterous 
ocean, they could at all times either commence or avoid 
close action at pleasure ; hence also the facility with which 
they got away to windward of our fleets when they no 



102 Rodney's actions of the 

longer wished to engage ; and most likely had it not been 
for the accidents which happened to some of their ships, 
in consequence of the battle of the ninth, Sir George 
Rodney might not have been able to overtake the fleet of 
the enemy, even had both been equally in possession of 
the breeze. 

In order to illustrate the above reasoning, the compa- 
rative dimensions of two classes of ships in the two fleets 
are given below. 

FRENCH AND BRITISH SECOND RATES. 

SHIP GUNS LENGTH BREADTH DEPTH TONS 

ft. ft in. ft. in. ft. in. 

Ville de Paris 102 185 7| 53 8-J 22 2 2347 

Formidable 98 177 6f 50 5 21 lgl5 fjj^ 






FRENCH AND BRITISH THIRD RATES. 

SHIP GUNS LENGTH BREADTH DEPTH TONS 

ft. ft. in. ft. in. ft. in. 

Le Northumberland 74 178 48 2| 21 2 1801 

Bedford* 74 168 6 46 9 20 1606 



That evening and the next day were principally occu- 
pied in refitting the disabled ships. Sir George Rodney 
also inverted the line from van to rear, the latter having 
had no share in the action of the ninth, as above accounted 
for. 

The chase of the enemy was then resumed with vigour, 
though there was no very great prospect of again suc- 
ceeding in bringing them to battle from the uniform su- 
periority of their fleet over ours in point of sailing. As a 
proof of the bad sailing of many of our ships, the Royal 
Oak was able to preserve her station in the rear, notwith- 
standing she could not carry sail on her main-mast (its 
head being shot away) save her main-sail.f 

* Some ot that class were only 1565 tons. 

f In an action during the late war, one of our finest ships was considered 
to have been put hors de combat, from a similar occurrence, notwithstanding 
the weather was very moderate. 



NINTH AND TWELFTH OF APRIL. 103 

On the 11th, two of the enemy's ships appeared to 
be disabled, and to leeward of their own fleet. Sir George 
Rodney accordingly made the signal for a general chase 
to windward.* This brought down De Grasse for their 
protection, but as soon as he peiceived that the retreat of 
his tw r o disabled ships f into Basse-terre, (Guadaloupe) 
was effected, he again hauled his w T ind. This reduced the 
French fleet to thirty-two sail of the line. 

During the night, whether from getting foul of some 
other ship, or from the injury she had sustained in the 
previous action, the Zel6, a French ship of 74 guns, lost 
her fore-mast and bowsprit. This circumstance of course 
impeded the progress of their fleet, and was the imme- 
diate cause of the action that ensued. 

The morning of the 12th presented to our view the 
above-mentioned French ship Le Zele, with her fore-mast 
and bowsprit gone, and towed by a frigate, both carrying 
all the sail they could to reach Basse-terre, (Guadaloupe.) 
Sir Samuel Hood from being in the rear, and consequently 
the nearest to these ships % was directed to send from his 
division some ships in chase of them. This task devolved 
on the Monarch, Valiant, Centaur and Belliqueux.^[ 

Before I proceed to narrate the proceedings which were 
occasioned by the above circumstance, I shall inform the 
reader of the actual situation of the two fleets, when the 
Zele was first discovered. 

The British fleet had tacked at midnight and stood to 



* Here the young midshipman's log, descriptive of the action, and pub- 
lished in Naval Battles, page 142, commences. 

i Le Caton and Le Jason afterwards taken in the Mona passage. 

I Had the fleet been on the starboard tack at day-light, as represented 
in some late publications, Sir Samuel Hood's division would have been 
the farthest off from these ships. 

% In the young midsdipman's log, it is stated that two only were sent at 
half-past five in chase, and were recalled at three quarters past five, allowing 
them only a quarter of an hour to make the attempt of catching these ships. 
They were not recalled until a quarter past seven. 



104 rodney's actions of the 

the northward until, I believe, four a. m., when it again 
tacked and stood to the southward, in which direction it 
was standing at day -light, with the larboard tacks on board, 
sailing in three divisions, Admiral Drake's in the van, Sir 
George Rodney's in the centre, and Sir Samuel Hood's 
bringing up the rear. The Saints bore about N. N. E., 
and the north end of Dominica, East, distant about five 
leagues. 

The French fleet at day- light bore N. E. ( i. e. to wind- 
ward), and about three leagues distant, having the larboard 
tacks on board, and under easy sail, to wait the issue of 
the Zele's attempt to reach Basse-terre. But the moment 
De Grasse perceived that four ships were sent in chase of 
her, he bore up with his whole fleet, doubtless to induce 
their recall, in which however he was deceived ; for Sir 
George Rodney, instead of recalling these ships, made the 
signal at six o'clock for the fleet to form into line, to 
tack,* and for Rear Admiral Drake's division to lead. 

When the Comte de Grasse perceived the British fleet 
to be in the act of tacking (headmost ships first, and the 
rest in succession), and of forming into line a-head upon 
the starboard tack, by which change of position it would 
fetch the body of his fleet, and thereby bring on an action 
which it was his duty to endeavour to avoid, having more 
important objects in view, he very judiciously caused his 
fleet to haul to the wind on the larboard tack, or that on 
which it had been sailing, previous to its having bore up 
at day-light to cover the Zele\ 

* In a recent publication, it is stated, from a journal written at the time, 
that " at six o'clock Sir Charles Douglas went into lord Rodney's cabin, who 
was then in bed, and told him that Providence had given the French fleet under 
his lee-bow, on which the Admiral got up." From this journal it would 
appear that the previous occurrences of the morning had takeu place without 
the Admiral being apprized of them, which is not very usual, and directly 
contrary to the instructions issued to captains of the fleet, who are not to 
make any important signals without directions from the Admiral to do so. 
Besides the French fleet at six o'clock were on the Formidable's weather 
quarter, and not " under her lee bow." See plate No. 1 of this action. 



NINTH AND TWELFTH OF APRIL. 105 

This measure he was compelled to adopt, as the islands 
called the Saints would have obstructed his line of march 
had he hauled to the wind on the starboard tack : more- 
over, could he have done the latter, his fleet would have 
been thrown into a bow and quarter line, which is not well 
calculated for retreat. Besides if the wind had not come 
from the southward, as it did very unexpectedly, it is 
more than probable that he would have escaped, after ex- 
periencing only a brush between his own rear and th 
British van. 

At about seven o'clock, the Formidable, Sir George 
Rodney's ship, put about, and took her station a-stern of 
the Duke, then on the starboard tack. If the Formidable 
was on the larboard tack until seven, how could the French 
fleet have been seen under her lee-bow at six o'clock ?* 

The four chasing ships were then recalled. This the 
copy from the Anson's log states to have taken place an 
hour and a half before this time, or in a quarter of an hour 
after they were ordered out in chase of Le Zele\ 

At half-past seven the Marlborough opened her fire on 
the ninth or tenth ship from the enemy's van. As she got 
near, she edged away and ran along" to leeward of their line, 
no signal having been made by the Admiral for her acting 
otherwise.f 

It was not until near nine o'clock, that the whole fleet 
was formed on the starboard tack, there being but little 
wind. About the same time, the whole of the centre 
division was in action, as was that part of Sir Samuel 
Hood's which was nearest to the centre. 

At half-past nine the whole of the fleet, from van to rear, 
was engaged, in consequence of the change of wind having 



* It is so stated to have been in a recent publication, before alluded to. 

t If Mr. Clerk's Attack from the Leeward had been finished and ready for 
the press when he published his Attack from the Windward in January that 
year, the Marlborough probably would have been ordered to cut through 
the enemy's line. Was there such a signal? 
M 



106 RODNEY'S actions of the 

driven the French van down upon our rear.* At nearly the 
same period, the Marlborough had passed the sternmost 
ship in the French line, and as soon as Rear Admiral 
Drake had done the same, he made the signal to his division 
to tack, which signal, however, was shortly after superseded 
by that for it to ware. Both signals are recorded in the 
copy of the Anson's log published in "Naval Battles/' 
but no cause is assigned either by the writer of that log, 
or the gallant author, to account for the above change of 
signal. 

At about ten o'clock, the southerly wind having reached 
the centre division, and the Duke having hauled more up 
in consequence thereof, it was observed from on board her, 
through the dense smoke which then enveloped all that 
part of the fleet, that a ship was right a-head of, and 
apparently standing towards her: as they approached 
each other nearer, she proved to be an enemy's ship which 
had been compelled to break off, from the change of wind, 
as stated above. Each ship put her helm a-weather to 
endeavour to go to leeward of the other, in which effort 
the Duke at length succeeded. This of course caused a 
greater opening in the French line, (if the straggling and 
irregular position of the French ships at that moment can 
be called a line) between the ship attempting to clear the 
Duke, and the Glorieux, her second a-head, which from 
the same cause found herself on the starboard bow of the 
Formidable. Sir George Rodney being thus situated, it 
was generally understood that he had no choice left him 
but to go through the opening in the French fleet, or be- 
come entangled, as the Duke was at that moment with the 
French ship above alluded to. 

Beatson, who compiled and published his memoirs as 
soon after the events took place as he could, says on this 
subject : 

* The French van very early in the morning began to break off in con- 
sequence of the wind heading it. 



NINTH AND TWELFTH OF APRIL. 107 

"About ten o'clock, the van of the French fleet, and 
part of the centre, and the whole of the rear of the British, 
had little wind from the southward, which forced that 
part of the French fleet to alter its course ; and which, by 
obliging the van to steer to the westward, whilst the rear 
continued its course to the southward, completely de- 
ranged the French line of battle, and formed the opening 
in which Admiral Rodney found his ship, and some part of 
his division, when the firing ceased and the smoke cleared 
away. 

"The ships of the British centre, by changing their 
course with the alteration of the wind during the battle, 
steered to the eastward instead of the northward, as the 
fleet had been originally steering. This occasioned the 
British line, by the parts steering different courses, to be 
also completely broken. The rear of the French fleet, con- 
sisting of about thirteen ships, was between the British 
van, which was composed of about seventeen ships, and 
Admiral Rodney with six of the centre division ; these 
six ships, had also Admiral De Grasse with five ships* 
on the other side of them, and he was completely divided 
from the rest of his own ships, by Sir Samuel Hood's 
division, then engaged with the van of the French fleet. 
Thus were the two fleets, by change of wind alone, and by 
no other cause, completely deranged ; each of them divided 
into three different parts,\ which were entirely separated, 
by some ships of the opposing fleet intervening. 

"Admiral Rodney in his own ship, by changing his 
course with the change of wind, was separated from his 
second a-head.% Whether this change of the course of 

* De Grasse had five ships with him, independent of the Vilie de Paris. 

f Had Mr. Clerk or Rear Admiral Ekins read Beatson's account of this 
battle, they surely would not have asserted that, in consequence of the For- 
midable going through the French line, it was cut in " twain." Yet on this 
erroneous basis these writers have, reared what 1 can scarcely- call their 
respective theories— the theory of the one being little more than a transcript 
of the other. 

t The Duke. 



10$ *RODNEY ? S ACTIONS OF THE 

Admiral Rodney's ship happened from inadvertence in the 
heat of the battle, or from design, does not clearly appear. 
It took place about ten o'clock, and was probably UN know n 
to the Admiral himself. 

"The whole success of the battle on the 12th of April, 
has been sometimes attributed to this measure. The 
British Admiral has also been supposed to break through 
a connected line of the enemy's ships. These representa- 
tions, however, appear to proceed from mistake, for the 
French line was completely deranged by the change of 
wind alone ; and so far was the measure of sailing through 
the enemy's line with six ships, unconnected with the rest 
of the fleet, from being decisive of victory, that it may 

BK DOUBTED WHETHER IT WAS A FORTUNATE EVO- 
LUTION. " And, "whilst the ships of both fleets were in 
the disorder which has been mentioned, owing to the 
change of wind, they were so little under the directions of 
the Commander-in Chief, that many of the Captains must 
have been guided entirely by their own judgment in the 
measures they were to pursue" 

In the memoirs above referred to, not the slightest men- 
tion is made of any difference of opinion having taken 
place between the Commander-in-Chief, and his Captain 
of the Fleet, respecting the Formidable having broken the 
continuity of her own line, by passing through that of the 
enemy, on the morning of the 12th of April ; nor was I 
aware of the alleged altercation, until I met with an ac- 
count of it in the work entitled "Naval Battles." From 
Sir Charles Douglas's well known suavity of manners, 
and uniform correctness of conduct, nothing but the 
strongest evidence should convince me of the fact; and 
how he could have used the language ascribed to him, in 
the very teeth of the 11th and 22nd articles of war, is 
astonishing. 

From a regard to his memory, I am induced to hope that 
there must have been some misconception of the words 



NINTH AND TWELFTH OF APRIL. 109 

which may have taken place between the Admiral and 
the Captain of the Fleet, on that memorable occasion. 
Very happily for the maintainance of discipline, the ill- 
judged discussion was prudently confined to the ship of 
the Commander-in-Chief; at all events it did not obtain 
currency on board the ship of the second in command ; or 
if it did, it never reached my ears, although I was fre- 
quently in attendance, in time of battle, and on other 
public occasions, on that gallant and highly distinguished 
officer Lord Hood, and had the honor of being admitted to 
his table at least once, and often twice in the week ; where, 
had the subject been introduced, I could not have well 
failed to have heard it. Nor was it ever mentioned in my 
hearing, in the cockpit of the second in command, the 
usual emporium of all the news in the fleet ; while I per- 
fectly remember to whom was attributed the advice said 
to have been given to the Commander-in-Chief, to cease to 
pursue the enemy at sun-set, as well as the precise words, 
in which the advice was said tobe conveyed ; but respect 
for the worthy dead seals my lips, and restrains my pen, 
when truth and justice do not demand disclosure. 

At about the same time the Formidable went through 
the French line, between the Glori gsx * and her second Jy&zs&ci 
a -stern ; the Bedford also passed through it, between the 
third and fourth ship a-head of De Grasse, but it does not 



* It has been asserted that the Glorieux was then " shorn of all her masts, 
bowsprit, and ensign staff." If that were the case, how did she contrive to 
follow in train of her Admiral ? or why was she not followed and taken 
possession of at ten, instead of being left in the hands of the enemy until 
one o'clock on the afternoon of that day? Captain Inglis makes no mention 
of any &uch circumstance in a conversation recorded by Clerk, and the young 
midshipman in his log quoted in *' Naval Battles," says that " at noon, when 
the smoke cleared away, we saw the Glorieux dismasted." Now as he ap- 
pears to have seen all the transactions which took place in the centre of our 
fleet, in spite of the smoke that then enveloped it, he of course would like- 
wise have observed the circumstance of the Glorieux losing her masts, had 
it then happened at ten o'clock, when he saw the Formidable go through the 
French line, and perceived the French Diadem to go down, &c, 



r. 



110 RODNEY S ACTIONS OF THE 

appear that Commodore Affleck was at all aware of having 
done so, until he got clear of the smoke, by having passed 
the stern-most ship of the French van. 

In consequence of the above fortuitous circumstances, 
both fleets were alike broken into three unequal portions, 
instead of being cut in twain, as is asserted by Mr. Clerk, 
and re-echoed by the author of " Naval Battles." 

Had these writers consulted the judicious Beatson, or 
the little work given to the world by the late Captain 
Matthews, they would have avoided the errors into which 
they have fallen respecting this battle. 

The wind from still heading more and more the French 
van, brought them into closer contact with Sir Samuel 
Hood's division than would otherwise have been the case. 
Owing to this, and the light air of wind gradually sab- 
siding, these portions of the two fleets continued to be 
closely engaged until twelve o'clock, and a few of the 
stern-most ships in either division maintained the conflict 
until near one. 

As soon as the stern-most ship in the French rear or 
northern division had passed round the stern of the Duke,* 
which was then the last ship in the van, or northern division 
of the British fleet, the firing of course must have ceased 
in that part of the field of battle. When the smoke from 
those ships cleared away (which must have occurred 
somewhere about half-past eleven), Sir George Rodney 
doubtless discovered that that portion of the enemy's fleet 
had slipped through his fingers, in consequence of the se- 
paration which had unfortunately taken place in his own 
Fleet. He therefore, as soon as he rejoined his van, wore 
round in pursuit. 
The six ships that were with De Grasse, had silently 



The Duke was a-head, and not a-stern of the Formidable. In the line 
of battle given out she was so placed, but it should be remembered, that the 
line was inverted on the 10th. 



NINTH AND TWELFTH OF APRIL. Ill 

made their way through the spacious opening offered them 
between the Ajax and Bedford, which was occasioned by 
the change of wind before alluded to, and effected their 
escape nearly about the same time, between the division 
of Sir George Rodney and Sir Samuel Hood, but un- 
perceived by either of those officers. 

At about twelve o'clock, in consequence of the above 
occurrences, the firing had nearly ceased, with the ex- 
ception of two or three of our rear ships that were still 
engaged with two or three of the stern-most ships of the 
Comte de Vaudreuil's division, then endeavouring to pass 
them with a very light air of wind. 

The smoke now clearing more awa}% a ship of the line 
was discovered to the northward from the Barfleur, without 
a mast standing. She was soon recognized to be an 
enemy, and to be in tow of a Frigate. When the smoke 
had nearly dispersed, the British centre and van divisions 
were seen from the same ship on the other side of, and 
directing their course towards the disabled ship of the 
enemy, having a light air from the E.S.E. Sir Samuel 
Hood's division was becalmed, with the exception of the 
Bedford, (united with it from the change of wind) and 
another ship near her, which, as well as the advanced 
ships of the opposite divisions, were striving to seize 
upon this first manifestation of victory. The Canada, 
one of the centre division, from her superior sailing, suc- 
ceeded in coming up with her. She proved to be the 
Glorieux, and must have lost her masts in consequence of 
the tremendous cannonade she sustained, while passing 
the Formidable and the five ships a-stern of her.* Her 
flag had been subsequently nailed to the stump of her 
main-mast, by order of her late Captain previous to his 
death. 

* See Captain Inglis's account of the destructive fire ponied into this ship 
by the Canada, when they passed each other in opposite directions at 10 a.m. 
as given by Clerk, in page 251. 



112 Rodney's actions of the 

It is most probable that this must have been the period, 
when the Captain of the Fleet exclaimed : "behold, Sir 
George, the Greeks and Trojans* contending for the body 
of Patroclus." This is in perfect accordance with the usual 
style of expression used by Sir Charles Douglas, while 
the answer to it is not only agreeable to that of Sir George 
Rodney, but the anxiety marked in it conveys the idea 
of the emotions which were then passing in the speaker's 
mind : for until the smoke was completely dispersed 
(which it was not when the 'Glorieux was first seen), and 
the actual state of the French fleet discovered , the pro- 
priety of the measure of having gone through the French 
line could not but have been extremely doubtful. No 
wonder then that his answer to so florid a speech, at such 
a time, should have been, "damn the Greeks, and damn the 
Trojans ; I have other things to think of:" but soon after 
perceiving, possibly for the first time, the shattered and 
confused condition of the enemy's fleet, and that his own 
rear were in a fit state to renew the combat, we cannot be 
surprised at his turning towards the Captain of the Fleet, 
and making the amende honorable for his previous rude- 
ness of expression, in these words, " now my dear friend, 
I am at the service of your Greeks and Trojans, and the 
whole of Homer's Iliad, or as much of it as you please, 
for the enemy is in confusion, and our victory is secure."J 

At this time the French ships were endeavouring to 
make the best of their way to the westward, with all the 
tattered canvas they could spread to a light air, which 
just enabled them to keep their heads in that direction. 

The moment the Canada compelled the Glorieux to 
strike her colours, she proceeded after another enemy with 



*The Greeks I presume were the advanced ships of Sir George Rodney's 
division, the Trojans of Sir Samuel Hood's ; each were striving to seize upon 
this unfortunate hulk, from the opposite sides of the field of battle. 

jThe man must be insane, who could fancy for a moment that breaking 
both lines could be considered as decisive of victory. 



NINTH AND TWELFTH OF ApRtL. IIB 

all the speed the lightness of the air would admit of, and 
Jeft her prize to be taken possession of by one of the 
disabled ships. The Admiral made the Royal Oak's 
signal to perform this piece ef service, 

At about one o'clock, a breeze sprung up, when every 
ship endeavoured to fulfil, to the letter, the signal to chase 
made by the Admiral ; who also made a signal for cIqsg 
action. 

Shortly after this, the separated centre and rear divisions 
of the French fleet formed a junction with each other, and 
steered S.W. to re-unite themselves with their van division, 
which steered so as to meet them. At about two o'clock, 
all the three disjointed divisions of their fleet were again 
united, and steered first a westerly, and then a W. N.W. 
course, having only lost one of their number, owing to her 
being" totally dismasted. 

It has been asserted that De Grasse attempted to re-form 
his fleet into line of battle, and face, a second time, his 
more fortunate enemy, but that he could not get his 
captains to second his views by complying' with his signals 
for that purpose. 

Any one who saw the mutilated state of a very great 
majority of that fleet, could not but have concluded that 
they were incapable of complying with these orders, if 
indeed they were issued, as such sails as they could set 
were perfectly riddled with shot 

At a little after three, the Centaur came up with, and 
began to engage, the Cesar, one of Vaudreuil's division, 
after a chase of an hour and a half at least, if not of two 
hours. The Cesar had no sail left but a fore-top sail full 
of shot-holes ; her main-yard was half hanging- over her 
side; her main-top-sail-yard was in the top with the top- 
sail hanging in tatters over the top rim, and the sheets 
shot away; the top-gallant-sail flying away in ribbands, 
and not an entire sail, if any, on her mizen-mast; yet 
she maintained the conflict until the Centaur laid Ijer 

N 



114 rodney's actions of the 

on-board, and carried her by boarding. Notwithstanding 
this ship was in so disabled a state,, the Centaur was 
compelled to set lower, top-mast, and top-gallant studding- 
sails, and royals, to overtake her, and when along-side of 
her, did not dare to take in a single sail — nay, even engaged 
with the lower studding-sail set on the side not engaged, 
lest her opponent should escape her. When Captain 
Inglefield ran her a-board, he was enabled to shorten sail, 
in consequence of their anchors hooking each other. The 
crews of both then exchanged ships ; that of the Centaur 
poured in upon the deck of her adversary, while that of the 
Cesar crept into the Centaur's lower deck ports, appre- 
hensive of their own ship going to the bottom.* The 
Cesar, in the course of the evening, caught fire, in conse- 
quence of some of her remaining crew having broken open 
the spirit-room, where they became intoxicated. The first 
Lieutenant of the Centaur had the charge of the prize, and, 
with a determination worthy of a Granville, never left the 
stern-walk, after all hope of extinguishing the fire was 
over,f where he, with many more unfortunate men of both 
crews, were drowned, or perished in the flames. 

At about four o'clock, the Canada came up with 
L'Hector, and, after an action of twenty minutes, com- 
pelled her to strike. The gallant Cornwallis con- 
signed to her the care of the Alcide, whose signal was 
made to take possession of her. This ship was nearly the 
most entire of the whole of the enemy's fleet. Probably 
her being captured was owing to the quantity of stores 
that had been embarked on board her. 

The Canada then pushed on for the Ville de Paris, on 
whose stern and quarters she at intervals kept up a most 



* The boatswain of the Cesar had been one of the crew, if not boatswain, 
of the Centaur when captured from the French in 1759. His old ship was 
recognized by him when coming up a-stern. 

t The writer regrets that he should not recollect the name of this gallant man. 



NINTH AND TWELFTH OF APRIL. 115 

destructive fire, until the arrival of the Barfleur, Sir Samuel 
Hood's ship. 

From one o'clock, when the breeze sprung up, the whole 
fleet were in chase of the flying enemy. This, it must be 
admitted, is contradicted in the extraordinary statement 
advanced in the copy of the Anson's Log published in 
"Naval Battles," which is as follows: "At five minutes 
past four, the Admiral made the signal to ware ; do. wore 
ship, and bore up for the enemy." 

Probably the writer, in the hurry not unusual among 
midshipmen when so occupied, forgot what he had re- 
corded just before, wherein he states, — "At twenty- 
five minutes past one, our fleet closed with the enemy, 
every ship engaging as they could come up with them ; 
they still carried all the sail they could. At fifty minutes 
past one, the signal for a closer action was again repeated ; 
several of our weather-most ships renewed the action with 
the enemy's rear."* 

At five o'clock, the Belliqueux came up with the Ardent, 
(taken from us in 1779) each mounting 64 guns. After 
an engagement of about fifteen minutes, the latter struck 
to the former, and immediately after hoisted a red ensign, 
which, it was afterwards understood, was done by some 
English prisoners, who were delighted to be thus liberated 
from the jaws of a French prison. 

At this time the Barfleur was in chase of the Triom- 
phant, as Sir Samuel Hood was desirous of leaving the 
Ville de Paris to grace the triumph of his chief, who in 
the Formidable was some distance a-stern of, but using 
every effort to come up with her. 

In a French work, read many years ago by the writer, 
it was stated that the Comte de Grasse proposed to his 



* The writer, until he met with the above public record, through ignorance 
possibly, always conceived that, at the above period, (" fifty minutes after 
one") the whole of the French fleet was to leeward of the British. By this 
account, it would appear that we had the enemy on both sides of us. 



110 hodney's actions of the 

Officers to blow up the ship when every chance of escape 1 
was despaired of; to which they not assenting, he decided 
on striking his flag to his old antagonist then passing him 
on his larboard beam, just out of reach of shot. The 
Canada's annoying attacks on the stern and quarters of 
the Ville de Paris, no doubt greatly contributed to pro- 
duce this determination. The Ville de Paris accordingly 
hauled to port, and fired a shot of defiance, from one of 
her lower deck guns, at the Barfleur, which ship on her 
part hauled to starboard, in token of assent to the challenge 
thug openly proclaimed. The two ships approached each 
other about six o'clock, and when they had mutually got 
Within musket shot, a most tremendous conflict ensued.* 

The Canada then desisted from firing into the Ville de 
Paris, and passed On a-head in search of another foe. At 
least this was the impression on the writer's mind at the 
time* which he still believes to be Correct, from the con- 
viction that Cornwallis was too high-minded a man to en- 
gage any one when opposed to an equal antagonist. 

At about twenty minutes after six, Sir Samuel Hood 
gave directions to ruh across the bows of the Ville de 
Paris* in order to rake her. These orders were instantly 
Complied with; for no subordinate officer, however high 
his rank, would have dared to dispute his orders, or even 
i© delay their execution for an instant, with impunity ; but 
just as they were about to be put into execution, De Grasse, 
perceiving his opponent's intention, and finding that almost 
all around him were either killed or wounded, ordered 
his White flag at the main to be hauled down, in token of 
submission to his more fortunate enemy, whom he 
esteemed and admired. Both ships then hove to> that the 

:& The Young Midshipman's Log, inserted in '" Naval Battles,'* states, " that 
at five minutes past five, the Ville de Paris kept tip a heavy fire on both sides 
together." At that time, the Canada was the only ship firing at her, but as 
\he Anson must have been some away a-stern, it might have so appeared 
toft-bcard that ship. This shews how dangerous it is to describe battles frork 
^fee tog of Any i'ndividtra! ship., 






NINTH AND TWELFTH OF APRIL. 117 

first Lieutenant of the Barfleur (Richard Deacon), might 
take possession of the prize. The Formidable, Sir 
George Rodney, had by that time got up so close, that he 
immediately sent Captain Lord Cranstoun on board with 
a message (no doubt of condolence) to the brave but 
vanquished Admiral. Candour and equity would be at a 
loss to decide which of the two officers first reached the 
Ville de Paris ; perhaps Lord Cranstoun, being the 
younger and more active man, might have been first 
on her quarter-deck. The moment the Barfleur's jolly^ 
boat returned from that ship, Sir Samuel Hood was about 
to crowd sail after the other French Admiral, whom he 
had given up the chase of to attack the French Chief, 
when the night signal to bring to was made by the 
Admiral. 

With respect to the propriety, or impropriety of the 
measure of having brought the fleet to, young as I then 
was, it would ill become me to hazard an opinion ; nor 
should any one undertake to do so who is not in full 
possession of all the various reasons and complicated 
circumstances, which, on the spur of the moment, in*- 
fluenced Sir George Rodney's decision. 

In the copy of the Anson's log, quoted in the work en^ 
titled " Naval Battles Critically Reviewed and Illus- 
trated," mention is made of the following" circumstance, 
which may contribute to throw some light on the pn> 
priety of discontinuing" tho pursuit of the French fleet, after 
the capture of the French Admiral at sun-set. After 
enumerating" the ships that followed the French fleet all 
night, in consequence of their not having perceived the 
signal made by Sir George Rodney for the fleet to bring 
to, it says, " At six a. m. saw our fleet from the mast-head 
bearing E.N.E. but no sight of the French fleet." 

Is not this a complete answer to the "Veteran Officer's" 
remark, given in that work, "that it was as easy to have 
taken fifteen as five sail of the line? " 



118 Rodney's actions of the 

Did the " Veteran Officer " take an enemy in the ship 
he commanded ? or did he mean by his observation that 
had the British line remained entire during the morning" 
engagement, fifteen of the enemy's ships would have been 
taken ? If that were the ground work of his insinuation, 
the writer most cordially assents to its correctness — but 
yet he cannot but think that it would have been more 
seemly, had his remark been accompanied with some 
proof of its justice. But it is more than probable that 
the gallant Veteran never expected that it would have 
survived himself, or doubtless he would have been more 
cautious in giving an opinion on so weighty a matter, as 
the honor and professional character of such a man as 
Lord Rodney, without assigning at the same time his 
reasons for advancing it. 

In the before quoted work, we also meet with the 
following observation, on which I shall beg leave to offer 
a few remarks. " On this day, nothing- could be better 
conducted, whether by accident or design, than the cutting 
the line in twain by the centre of the British fleet, as shown 
in plate 18. fig. 2. but let it be observed, that the 
enemy, by proceeding as recommended in the figure, had 
it in his power to retaliate with great effect ; " in other 
words, that the measure was a good one, because the 
French Admiral was not a sufficiently good tactician to 
take advantage of it, and by a counter manoeuvre, prove 
it to have been a bad one. Admitting for the sake of 
argument, that the two fleets were only cut in twain, as 
asserted by that author, instead of being broken into three 
several parts, as they actually were, yet I cannot perceive 
how the proposed measure of retaliation could have proved 
disastrous to the British rear, as fancied by the gallant 
illustrator in question. Was not the French van (according 
at least to the plan of the battle given by him) moving in 
the same direction, and with equal velocity as their rear? 
If so, how could they present a double front to the thus 



NINTH AND TWELFTH OF APRIL. 119 

assailed British rear? It was impossible, unless the 
French' van had brought to, which was not within the 
compass of the author's suggestion. What were the British 
van to be about ? 

In page 149, the same author is equally unfortunate in 
his pioposed mode of attack by the headmost ships of the 
French rear, unless he meant to have it understood that 
the British were laying to for the express purpose of giving 
the French third in command an opportunity of displaying 
his tactics for the edification of Sir Samuel Hood and his 
experienced division. Had the gallant writer been better 
acquainted with the whole of the occurrences, as well as 
circumstances of that day, he would have known that the 
French van had not sufficient wind to attempt such a 
measure, and that their ships were not in a state to effect it 
— nor, I should think, had they the slightest wish to try so 
hazardous an experiment. 

That Mr. Clerk should have broached nearly similar 
opinions, no one can be astonished, he having been ac- 
customed to draw his very manageable ships from his 
pocket, in order to display their evolutions on the first 
table he met with. Having thus the movements of both 
fleets at his own disposal (to say nothing of that enthusiam 
that generally characterizes a projector,) it is no wonder 
that he should have overlooked the want of, or opposition 
from, winds, which frequently occurs to embarrass the 
actual movements of fleets on the ocean. Besides, can 
any one suppose for a moment that sixty- seven ships of 
the line can maintain a combat of five hours' duration, 
without raising such a cloud of smoke as to render signals 
entirely useless ? Yet too many accounts lately given of 
this action would lead the inexperienced reader to infer 
that each individual transaction was distinctly seen and 
heard from one end of the British line to the other. On 
board the ship in which I was serving at the time, so dense 
was the smoke, and so deafening was the incessant roar of 



120 rodney's actions of the 

cannon, that often one could scarcely perceive the nearest 
ship, and it was with some difficulty that the necessary 
orders could be communicated, 

In page 144 in the same work, is the following remark : 
"From this plain narrative, taken by the Master of the 
Anson, &c. it is seen that, breaking the enemy's line oc- 
casioned confusion ; and confusion led to defeat" 

If breaking their line put the enemy into confusion, how 
could they, while in this confusion, "retaliate with great 
effect? 

The same author, in his proposed mode of attack, after 
the Formidable passed through the French line at ten a.m. 
advances such an extraordinary mode of proceeding as to 
demand a moment's investigation. 

While the British rear is closely engaged with the French 
van, he recommends that the former should leave off en- 
gaging the latter, and run down to attack the flying French 
van to leeward of it, 

If Sir Samuel Hood had acted in such a manner, he 
would have run away from that portion of the enemy that 
were to windward that he might run down to engage 
that part of the French fleet that was to leeward of him. 
This would have been placing himself between two fires> 
unless the weather French division can be supposed to be 
pusillanimous enough to allow this operation to be put 
into practice without making the slightest effort to assist 
or support their Hear division, a supposition not very flat- 
tering to that brave and high spirited people. 

That Mr. Clerk, who seldom stopped to consider whether 
a proposition were practicable or not, should have recom- 
mended the mode oi proceeding which he did in plate 9. 
Part II. fig. 38, after the French line was broken at ten 
a. m. cannnot excite much astonishment ; but that a pro- 
fessional writer should have taken up the same ground? 
and recommended the same measure without waiting to 
enquire whether the proposed object of attack were visible,, 



NINTH AND TWELFTH OF APRIL. 121 

or whether there was any wind to enable the fleet to carry 
it into effect, cannot but excite surprise; particularly 
when these two impediments did actually occur to pre- 
vent the adoption of the measure ; a measure which the 
pusillanimity of an enemy alone could render availing. 

Mr. Clerk, in describing the manner in which the French 
rear, under Monsieur de Bourgainville, effected their 
escape through the opening made in the British line, by 
the Formidable having gone through that of the French? 
says, " This division was not pursued." 

Now if this division was not pursued, not a ship in it 
could have been taken. What result t hen did this mighty 
manoeuvre of sailing through the French line produce? 
Nothing but to open a way by which thirteen ships of the 
enemy escaped. 

Could the whole of that division have avoided capture if 
they had been obliged to pass the fiery ordeal of the eighteen 
ships a-stern of the Formidable, as they must have done had 
the British line remained entire? A boy who has been six 
months at sea would be competent to answer this question. 

If the Formidable fired her larboard guns the moment 
the great manoeuvre was triumphantly carried into effect,, 
and continued to do so, as represented by Mr. Clerk, for 
hours, how did it happen that the Canada, one of the six 
ships that accompanied and was a-stern of Sir George 
Rodney, only made use of her starboard guns at the 
Glorieux, while supposed to be passing close to the head- 
most ships in the French rear division, then to leeward of 
her? And how did it happen that the Captain of the St. 
Albans, the ship next a-head of the Canada, had appa- 
rently neither any particular occupation, nor any smoke to 
prevent him giving his whole attention to the destructive 
fire poured by the Canada into the Glorieux, in passing 
on her starboard side ? * 

* See Clerk's Tactics, note in page 251, in which Captain Inglis appears to 
have had nothing to do, "his ship having passed on ahead," i, e. out of the 
action. 



122 Rodney's actions of the 

According to Mr. Clerk, the Formidable, Namur, and 
Duke, remained stationary, that they might have the plea- 
sure of raking the French rear ships as they bore up to run 
through the opening made for them ; and when they had all 
passed through, instead of following them, Mr Clerk tells 
us Sir George Rodney tacked his division in succession, 
that he might go in chase, not of the French ships nearest 
to him, but of those that were two miles off, and which 
had effected their escape round the stern-most ship in the 
British rear. 

Now if Sir George Rodney did tack his division, as 
above described by Mr. Clerk, it would have passed to 
the southward of Sir Samuel Hood's, and would have been 
discovered in that direction when the smoke cleared away 
at noon, instead of being seen to the northward, as it was 
at that period. 

Mr. Clerk also places the Duke a-stern of the Namur, 
when she, in fact, had become the stern-most ship of the 
British separated van division. In fact Mr. Clerk appears 
to have been bewildered between his own pre-conceived 
opinions of this battle, and the imperfect accounts he 
obtained of it, which he in vain attempted to reconcile. 

In another place, Mr. Clerk asserts that the French fleet 
was seen at day-light " broad under their lee-bow, in some 
confusion" yet in a subsequent paragraph he states, that 
"at half-past seven a. m. the Marlborough, the leading ship 
of the van of the British, having fetched the fifth ship of 
the enemy's line, she was fired upon." 

Did the Marlborough make a bend or sweep to leeward 
that she might avoid the fire of the four head-most ships 
in the French line, which she must have done if the French 
were broad upon her lee bow, when she set out upon her 
expedition ? 

Sir George Rodney is also made to commit, by the same 
writer, the egregious error of sending some of his southern- 
most ships in chase of a French disabled ship of the line, 



NINTH AND TWELFTH OF APRIL. 123 

seen to the northward. Were any one to credit Mr. 
Clerk's account of this battle, that person if he have com- 
mon sense, and a common knowledge of seamanship, 
could not but conclude that Sir George Rodney must 
have taken leave of his senses. 

Again, " So soon as the van division of the enemy had 
stretched past the rear of the British line, in bearing away, 
it broke into two divisions." 

Mr. Clerk, or his informant, not having been aware of 
the fracture that was made in the French line a-head of 
de Grasso at 10 a. m. by the Bedford, was obliged to put 
his ingenuity to the stretch in order to account for the 
separation which was evident, when the smoke cleared 
away at noon, between the two French Admirals de Grasse 
and Vaudreuil. These he tells his readers prepared 
themselves to separate while partially engaged with Sir 
Samuel Hood's division. If that were the case how came 
de Grasse subsequently to take so much trouble to re-unite 
his three separated divisions ? 

He then places the Ville de Paris with the southern 
instead of the centre division of the French fleet, and 
makes that division steer S.S.W. notwithstanding that 
ship and her division, were to the northward and westward 
of the Barfleur, from one p. m. until sun-set. 

In the next paragraph but one, Mr. Clerk makes the 
same semi- van or southern division steer to the northward. 
Had the Comte de Grasse acted so imprudently, many 
more ships of the enemy must inevitably have been taken. 

Let us only reflect for a moment ; — the British fleet are 
steering to the westward. A French division, among which 
is De Grasse, being to leeward or to the westward of them, 
is represented to be steering S. S.W. and then all at once 
as steering to the northward.* If that were the case, what 
were the British fleet about that they did not take the 
whole of these twelve or thirteen ships, which must have 

* Sec Clerk's Tactics, page 253. 



124 rodney's actions of the 

first stood away from them in one direction, and then have 
crossed them in a nearly opposite direction ? 

In order to make this clearer, let us put the following 
proposition. — 

If a French squadron at F. bear N.W". from a British 
squadron at B. at the distance of three miles from each 
other; and if the squadron F. run three miles on a S. S. W. 
course, and then turn about and steer on a northerly 
course,-f what distance will B. have to sail on a W.N.W. 
course,^ for it to intercept the squadron F ? 

Answer, three miles and three quarters. So that while 
F. has been running" in its flight live miles ; B. by going 
only three miles and three quarters on a steady course, 
will intercept F. and bring it to close action. 

Can any one suppose that if De Grasse had so con- 
ducted his fleet, twenty-six ships of the enemy could have 
effected their escape ? 

I shall conclude these observations with Lord Howe's 
opinion of Mr. Clerk's plan of attack, of breaking his 
own line that he may divide that of his enemy as given 
in the Edinburgh Review: "after studying the whole 
work, I think it very ingenious ; but for my part, when I 
meet with an enemy, I am still resolved to fight him in 
the old way." 

On the 1st of June, he did fight them in the old way, 
yet Mr. Clerk in his preface to the second edition of his 
work, published in 1804, says, after speaking of the effects 
produced by the publication of his fifty copies on the 
attack from the windward, " our affairs at sea soon took 
a different turn ; and I have since had the satisfaction to 
see by the adoption of my system, a decided and per- 
manent superiority given to our fleets ! ! ! " 

This no doubt will be considered as being very flattering 
to our brave and gallant Admirals, who by their skill, as 

t These are courses that the French steered, according to Mr. Clerk. 
$ The course actually steered by Sir Samuel Hood's squadron division. 



NINTH AND TWELFTH OF APRIL. 125 

much as by their valour, raised the naval glory of our 
country to its highest possible pitch. 

It has thus I trust been established, that in the engage- 
ment of the 9th of April, every thing' was done by each of the 
three divisions of His Majesty's fleet that could be effected 
by valour, professional skill, and persevering effort to get 
into action; and that the supposed neglect imputed by a 
recent Historian* to the centre and rear divisions, was 
attributable solely to a want of wind, and not to any de- 
ficiency of energy or zeal, on the part either of Sir George 
Rodney or Rear Admiral Drake. 

I have also, I trust, satisfactorily shewn that the battle 
of the 12th, was brought on by the French Admiral having 
borne up before the wind for the purpose of affording pro- 
tection to the disabled French Ship Lc Zele, and not by 
the British fleet having stood to the southward till two in 
the morning, as is most unaccountably stated in Sir George 
Rodney's public letter, and repeated by Mr. Clerk and 
Rear Admiral Ekins in their description of this engage- 
ment. 

I have not allowed myself to be biassed by any con- 
sideration but facts, in bringing forward the statements 
I have ventured to lay before the public. On this principle 
also I have endeavoured to place in its due light, the so 
much vaunted measure of breaking the enemy's line. The 
boldest assertors of the claims of Mr. Clerk to the honour 
of this celebrated discovery, have not yet presumed to 
enumerate Commodore Affleck, of the Bedford, among his 
pupils, and yet it is true, that the Bedford, as well as the 
Formidable made her way between two of the enemy's 
ships, but in a different part, of what is called their line 
of battle. Owing to this circumstance the French fleet 
was, as has been already observed, broken into three 
parts instead of two as is commonly imagined, though we 
do not find that the gallant Affleck took any share of 

* Naval Battles, page 141. 



126 rodney's actions of the 

merit for achieving an exploit precisely similar to that 
which has been bruited with so much industry from John 
o' Groat's house to the Land's End. The victory of the 
12th of April, however, was so far from arising from this 
movement either of the Formidable or the Bedford, that 
the circumstance of the disjointed parts of the British line 
getting between equal portions of the enemy's fleet, pro- 
duced only the effect of allowing 1 seventeen or eighteen 
sail, to avoid the cannonade they must have encountered in 
weathering the ships of the British rear, which they must 
have done had they had to pass our whole line. How far 
they would have succeeded in doing so is another question, 
but the strong probability is, that had they, in the state 
in which they then were, been exposed to this additional 
ordeal, they would have shared the fate of their five cap- 
tured comrades. It seems evident then that we must 
ascribe the victory, under Providence, to the circumstance 
of the contending fleets being brought into close combat by 
Sir George Rodney tacking at the precise moment he did, 
and by a subsequent change of wind. This position gave 
to our brave countrymen an opportunity of exerting those 
qualities which are the result of firmer nerve and cooler 
courage, while it deprived their enemy of the advantage 
he was generally so fond of deriving from his superiority 
in sailing and consequently in manoeuvring, of which he 
availed himself whenever he could fight at long shot 
distance. 

I shall have been most unfortunately misunderstood, if 
in what has been asserted, it be imagined that there is the 
slightest intention to reflect on the memory of as brave a 
leader as ever took a fleet into action, because he did, 
either of his own will, or from the suggestions of others, 
or from circumstances over which he had no control, break 
the continuty of his own line, that he might sever that of 
the enemy, by which measure thirteen at least of the 
enemy's ships escaped, would otherwise have conferred 



NINTH AND TWELFTH OF APRIL. 127 

additional lustre on his triumph. I am only anxious that 
a point of such vital importance to my country as her naval 
superiority, should be established on impregnable grounds. 
The victory, under the circumstances in which, and at the 
time when the battle was fought, was a glorious and brilliant 
achievement, and far be it from me to strip a leaf from the 
green wreath which will encircle the Victor's fame in the 
annals of his country. His candid and ingenuous mind 
would have led him at once to acknowledge, that had not 
the opening been made in the British line, which was oc- 
casioned principally by a change of wind, the victory would 
have been more complete. It has been my object to give the 
young seaman an opportunity of duly appreciating this 
too much vaunted manoeuvre — the breaking of both lines, 
— - and to impress upon him that the victory is to be 
attributed to the judicious conduct of the British Admiral 
in taking prompt advantage of the circumstances with 
which Providence favoured him, and to the zealous energy 
he displayed from the commencement of the chase, to the 
final overthrow of the enemy. 



128 



LINE OF BATTLE. 



LINE OF BATTLE. 





No. Ships. 


Guns. Captains, Flag Officers. 




/ 1 Royal Oak, 


74, Burnett, 




/ 2 Alfred, 


74, Bayne, 




I 3 Montague, 


74, Bowen, 




\ 4 Yarmouth, 


64, Parry, 




\ 5 Valiant, 
' 6 Barfleur, 


74, Goodall, 

98, Knight, Sir Samuel Hood, Bt. Rear Admiral. 




J 7 Monarch, 


74, Reynolds, 


/ 8 Warior, 


74, Sir. J. Wallace, Bt„ 


A 9 Belliqueux, 


64, Sutherland, 


iJ-Osr-pt^er. 


j 10 Centaur, 


74, Inglefield, 




/ 11 Magnificent, 


74, Linzee, 




12 Prince William, 64, Wilkinson, 




V-13 Bedford, 


74, Graves, Commodore Affleck. 


f 


/^"14 Ajax, 


74, Carrington, 


/Z-L- L s / *&s?<~~^e~ 


1 15 Repulse, 


64, Dumaresque, 


/ 


\ 16 Canada, 


74, Cornwallis, 


^tu^£Z^s 


J 17 St Albans, 


6 J, Inglis, 


/> , . 


Jt 18 Namur, 


90, Fanshawe, 


Itt^^C <^t^> 


7 


CSir Charles Douglas,} Sir G. B. Rodney, Bt. K. B. 




V^19 Formidable, 


98, < >■ Admiral of the White, 
£ John Symons, } &c. &c. &c. 




/"20 Duke, 


98, Gardner, 




21 Agamemnon, 


64, Caldwell, 




| 22 Resolution, 


74, Lord Robert Manners, 




23 Prothee, 


64, Bucknor, 




j 24 Hercules, 


74, Savage, 


yLe^St^-*- ~ 


/ 25 America, 


64, Thompson, 


26 Russell, 


74, Saumarez 


27 Fame, 


74, Barbor, 


i^Z^f 


28 Anson, 


64, Blair, 


Is&^-t- i 


29 Torbay, 


74, Gedoin, 


30 Princessa 


70, Knatchbull, Rear Admiral Drake, 


, 


31 Prince George 


, 98, Williams, 


S^t-z^-s-^ < 071^ 1 


32 Conqueror, 


74, Balfour, 




33 Nonsuch, 


64, Truscott, 




34 Alcide, 


74, Thompson, 




35 Arrogant, 


74, Cornish 


I 


36 Marlborough, 


74, Penny, 









N. B. In the action of the 12th, the line was inverted 
from van to rear ; consequently the Marlborough led on 
that day, and the rest in succession. The numbers show 
the place of each ship in the accompauying Plates. 



BYERS, PRINTER; DEVONPORT. 



A SUPPLEMENT 



TO THE 



ACTION OF THE TWELFTH OF APRIL, 

1782. 






A SUPPLEMENT, 

8fc. 



Since the foregoing sheets went to press, the writer has 
been enabled to look over the second edition of the work 
entitled " Naval Battles," in which it appears, that the 
author has added to the original account of this engage- 
ment, the opinions of a French writer, a Mons. Ramatuelle, 
upon it. This gentleman has very naturally endeavoured 
to discover causes to which he can attribute the loss of 
this battle by his countrymen, rather than to candidly 
acknowledge the prowess of the victors by which it was 
achieved. The passage alluded to is as follows, 

" Of this battle it is observed by ' Ramatuelle,' that Lord 
Rodney attached considerable importance to the mode of 
attack — that of engaging upon opposite tacks ; to this, to 
the favourable change of wind, and to his superiority of 
force, he ascribes his succes ; which indeed he declares 
would have been followed by consequences the most disas- 
trous, had he been skilful enough to have made the most of 
his victory ; instead of which he says he shut himself up 
at Jamaica with all his fleet, permitting the French 
Admiral (Vaudreuil) to send two considerable convoys 
from St. Domingo, which arrived safe in France, under 
the protection of two ships of war, no longer able to keep 
the sea,"* 

*See " Naval Battles," 2nd Edit p. 179. 



132 A SUPPLEMENT TO THE 

In reply to the above it may be observed that Lord 
Rodney having attacked the enemy on different tacks, 
appears to have given offence to Mons. Ramatuelle, not 
because the measure was bad in itself, but because it led 
to the defeat of his countrymen. 

Can any Englishman object to Lord Rodney for having 
taken advantage of a circumstance which brought his 
own fleet in close contact with that of his enemy ? 

With respect to the " superiority of force" supposed to 
be possessed by the British fleet, if any one will take the 
trouble to make the calculation, the result will possibly 
turn out in favour of the enemy, at least as far as respects 
the weight of shot thrown by the respective combatants 
taken collectively. 

With respect to Lord Rodney not having " been skilful 
enough to make the most of his victory,'' it is only neces- 
sary to inquire whether Mons. Ramatuelle has shewn 
sufficient grounds whereon to found an allegation of so 
serious a nature as that which has been advanced by him 
— if not, it is unworthy of further notice, or of an attempt 
at refutation. 

He then goes on to say that Lord Rodney " shut himself 
up" — not in his cabin, as one might be led to suppose from 
what has lately appeared in print — but " at Jamaica," 
&c. Be that as it may, he previously sent, that is three 
days after the action, or as soon as he had ascertained by 
his cruizers that not a single French man of war was to be 
seen in the ports of any one of the Windward Islands 
(improperly called the "Leeward Islands"), Sir Samuel 
Hood, with his division, to scour the south side of the 
Islands of Porto Rico and St. Domingo, and then 
to rejoin him off Cape Tiburoon. During this excursion 
Sir Samuel captured two French line of battle ships, a 
frigate, and a sloop of war ; with these he rejoined his 
Commander in Chief at the appointed rendezvous. Lord 
Rodney took charge of his prizes, and again detached him 



ACTION OF THE TWELFTH OF APRIL. 133 

(Sir Samuel Hood) with twenty sail of the line, to cruize 
off Cape Francois, where he was to remain as long as 
his water and provisions would last, or for a specified 
time. It was thus that Lord Rodney " shut himself up 
at Jamaica with all his fleet." 

With respect to the last charge, that of two crazy ships 
having escorted two convoys from St. Domingo to France 
— were Mons. Ramatuelle to examine the archives of 
the French Marine, the writer believes he would find, that 
they were escorted by ten if not twelve sail of the line, 
and under the charge of Monsieur Bougainville himself. 

It is rather astonishing that this profound French 
writer should not have adverted to and given his opinion 
upon the grand manoeuvre — the breaking of the French 
and British lines. Perhaps he could have informed us 
whether they were broken in " Twain," or into three sepe- 
rate parts respectively. 

Was Mons. Ramatuelle aware that Lord Rodney was 
in the act of proceeding to sea the moment his fleet, prizes, 
&c. w r ere ready to accompany him, when, to the astonish- 
ment of himself and the whole fleet, he was superseded in 
his command ; not for misconduct, but because a change 
of ministry had taken place at home? 

Was Mons. Ramatuelle aware that the combined fleets 
of France and Spain in that country still amounted to 
forty ships of the line ? 

Will Mons. Ramatuelle, in the next edition of his work, 
favor the world with the actual dates of the periods when 
the two convoys left St. Domingo, of which he speaks, 
w T ith so much apparent exultation, as having reached 
France in safety ? 

Might not some blame attach to the British Ministry, 
or to the Admiral commanding the British fleet at home, 
for not having stationed cruizers off the French Ports, for 
the purpose of intercepting these valuable convoys, rather 
than to Lord Rodney, who had conquered the enemies of 



134 A SUPPLEMENT TO THE 

his King and Country, and who at that moment, perhaps, 
ceased to be in command ? 

Perhaps Monsieur Hamatuelle conceived that Lord 
Rodney retained the command of his Britannic Majesty's 
fleet in the West Indies until the conclusion of the war — 
in which case there might have been some grounds for the 
concluding remark in the extract taken from his work by 
the author of " Naval Battles." 

The only conclusion that can be drawn from Mons. 
Ramatuelle's extracted paragraph is, that the French fleet 
was more dreadfully mauled than even the writer of these 
sheets had conceived or has attempted to describe, and 
that, to the French at least, this Battle was something more 
than " Children s play."* 



* See "Naval Battles," page 146 in the first, and 177 in the second 
Edition. 



List of the French Fleet, commanded by the Comte de 
Grasse, Admiral of the White, 



Remarks, fyc. 
Taken, but lost on her passage home. 
Taken, Do. Do. 

Taken, never reached England. 
Taken, burnt by accident in the night. 
Taken, but never reached England. 

Do C in the Mona P assa £ e - 
No account of after the action.* 



* This ship is included in the line of battle given out by De Grasse, just previous to his 
leaving Fort Royal Bay, a copy of which the writer was favoured with, through the kindness of 
John Barrow, Esq., one of the Secretaries at the Admiralty. If this ship was not sunk, what 
became of her, as she appears in no subsequent list given of Bougainville's fleet? 



Ships. 


Guns. 


La Ville de Paris 


104, 


Le Glorieux 


74, 


L'Hector 


74, 


Le Cesar 


74, 


L' Ardent 


64, 


Le Caton 


64, 


Le Jason 


64, 


Le Diadem 


74, 



ACTION OF THE TWELFTH OF APRIL. 



135 



The following ships reached Cape Francois under Monsieur 
de Bougainville. 





Killed. 


Wounded* 


Remarks. 


L'Auguste 


84, had 14 


97 




LeTriomphant 


84, 


6 


36 




La Couronne 


84, 


16 


143 




Le due de Burgogne 


84, 


7 


214 




Le Lanquedoc 


84, 


53 


210 \ 


This ship was one of de Grasse's 
seconds. 


Le St. Esprit 


80, 


87 


76 




Le Magnaninie 


74, 


10 


142 Was lost at Boston. 


Le Neptune 


74, 


4 


107 




Le Brave 


74, 


14 


17 




Le Bien Aim6 


74, 


8 


n\ 


This ship was not included in de 
Grasse's List. 


Le Bourgogne 


74, 


25 


114 




Le Citoyen 


74, 


4 


76 




Le Conqaerant 


74, 


9 


114 




Le Dauphin Royal 


74, 


1 


89 




Le Palmier 


74, 


11 


193 




Le Northumberland 


74, 


7 


94 




Le Destin 


74, 


16 


126 




Le Sceptre 


74, 


9 


13 




Le Zele 


74, 


o 


68 J 


Lost her fore-mast on the night 
of the 11th. 


Le Souverain 


74, 


16 


176 
89 $ 


Afterwards run on shore by the 


Le Scipion 


74, 





Torbay and London. 


Le Reflechi 


64, 


2 


190 




Le Marseillois 


74,) 








L'Hercule 


74, f 


Put into Curagoa in a very shattered state. No 


Le Pluton 


74, r 


returns of their killed and wounded. 


L'Eveille 


64,3 








Le Sagittaire 
L' Experiment 


54, 1 

50, £ 


Were with the convoy. 



Total, 35 of the line, two 50-gun ships, and 14 frigates. 

In the action of the 12th, the French ships appear to 
have taken their stations as they could, or those of some 
of them must have been changed between the actions of 
the 9th and I2th. Generally speaking, the French van 
and those ships that were immediately a-head and a-stern 
of De Grasse appear to have suffered most; the former 
from having been upwards of two hours in close contact 
with Sir Samuel Hood's division the latter possibly from 
having been exposed to the irresistible fire of the 



* The wounded were designated as being sick, but were doubtless the wounded— there being 
no other return given of them in the French Account published by Beatson. 



136 A SUPPLEMENTS &c. 

Duke, Formidable, and Namur, which ships must have 
passed the French centre in slow time in consequence of 
the wind dying away just as they got to that part of their 
line, as well as from their having taken off the fiery 
edge of the British van, the whole of which must have 
passed them very close. 



EXPLANATIONS OF THE PLATES TO THE ACTION OF THE TWELFTH. 

PLATE FIRST. 

B. The British fleet tacking in succession. 

E. The four ships in chase. 

C. British frigates. 

Z. The Zele towed by a frigate. 

F. The French fleet coming to the wind on the larboard tack. - - 
f. French frigates. Wind E. N. E. 

PLATE SECOND. 

By a reference to the Line of Battle, the number against each ship will 
denote her name and station in the line. 
The Van are blue. The Centre a red cross. The Rear all red. 

PLATE THIRD. 

The divisions are denoted as before. 

A. The French Centre and Rear divisions, under De Grasse and Bougainville. 
V. The French Van under Vaudreuil. 

B. The British Centre and Van division having wore round after the enemy. 
E. The British Rear becalmed. 

D. The dismasted Glorieux towed by the Richmond frigate, and the object of 
pursuit to both portions of the British fleet 5 the whole nearly becalmed. 

PLATE FOURTH. 

B. B. British Centre and Van divisions. 

E. British Rear division. 

C. The Centaur taking possession of Le Cesar. 
I. Royal Oak taking possession of Le Glorieux. 
7. Monarch taking in more powder. 

A. A. The three French divisions forming a junction. 
H. The Canada closing with L' Hector. 



ERRATA. 

Page 29, line 20, for enchellon, read en-echelon. 
30, 13, Affleek, read Affleck. 
39, 20, after French Admiral, read arrived in. 
41, % 10, for would, read could. 

46, 29, tafrail, read taffrail. 

47, 13, after to find, read to find in. 

81, 18, larboard line, omit the comma. 

109, 3, in note, after follow in, insert the. 

114, 25, for to her, read her to. 
119, 7, French rear, read French van. 



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